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ABSTRACT
The inheritance system is beset by formalism. Probate courts reject wills on technicalities and
refuse to correct obvious drafting mistakes by testators. These doctrines lead to donative errors, or
outcomes that are not in line with the decedent’s donative intent. While scholars and reformers have
critiqued the intent-defeating effects of formalism in the past, none have examined the resulting
distribution of donative errors and connected it to broader social and economic inequalities.
Drawing on egalitarian theories of distributive justice, this Article develops a novel critique of
formalism in the inheritance law context. The central normative claim is that formalistic wills
doctrines should be reformed because they create unjustified inequalities in the distribution of
donative errors. In other words, probate formalism harms those who attempt to engage in estate
planning without specialized legal knowledge or the economic resources to hire an attorney. By
highlighting these distributive concerns, this Article reorients inheritance law scholarship to the
needs of the middle class and crystallizes distributive arguments for reformers of the probate system.
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INTRODUCTION
Bill Cornwell and Tom Doyle were romantic partners for over fifty years
before Bill died at the age of eighty-eight in 2014.1 The two artists lived together
in a brownstone building that Bill had purchased in 1979, when the
neighborhood was regarded as somewhat “slummy.”2 Tom was financially
dependent on Bill, who had the steadier job, and they both relied upon the
building for housing and rental income to supplement their Social Security
checks.3 Tom and Bill did not marry, primarily because legal marriage was not
available to same-sex couples in New York for most of their relationship;
however, after legalization, the couple’s health problems prevented them from
traveling to the courthouse.4
Bill executed a will several years before his death, devising their home to
Tom.5 Unfortunately, Bill had only one witness attest to the will, and New York
law requires two.6 The probate court rejected the will on this technicality even
though there was no serious doubt as to the document’s authenticity.7 Since
Bill and Tom had no relationship that was recognized by law, Bill’s nephews
and niece claimed the building as their inheritance, potentially displacing
Tom, who was then eighty-five years old.8 As for Bill and Tom’s relationship,

1.
2.
3.

4.

5.
6.
7.
8.

See Sarah Maslin Nir, A Brownstone and the Bitter Fight to Inherit It, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/24/nyregion/a-brownstone-and-the-bitter-fightto-inherit-it.html?_r=0.
See Paul Schindler, His Husband Gone, Gay Man Fights for Their Home, GAY CITY
NEWS (Oct. 27, 2016), http://gaycitynews.nyc/husband-gone-gay-man-fights-home
[https://perma.cc/Q3EG-CYTX].
See Affidavit of Petitioner Thomas Doyle in Support of Injunctive Relief ¶ 18, Estate of
Cornwell, No. 2014-3465 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. filed Oct. 28, 2016) (“I had, for the most part,
always been financially dependent on Bill. I worked as a freelancer, so my income was
never steady. . . . Without the rental income from the property, and the rent-free living
space, I will most certainly struggle to survive.”).
See Nir, supra note 1. Tom’s final legal theory was that they entered into a common-law
marriage in Pennsylvania when they traveled to that state. See Petition ¶ 5, Estate of
Cornwell, No. 2014-3465. The court ultimately rejected this theory. See Memorandum of
Law, Estate of Cornwell, No. 2014-3465.
See Nir, supra note 1.
See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-2.1(a)(4) (McKinney 2012).
See Nir, supra note 1.
See id. The nephews and niece offered Tom a five-year lease in his apartment at a nominal
rent, plus nearly 3.5 percent of the sale price. See id. Tom found this unacceptable, as it
meant he might need to leave the house in five years if he had not died. Id. The attorney
for the family members questioned whether they would “feel so benevolent” if Tom legally
contested the sale of the property that Bill’s relatives intended. Id. According to Arthur
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the relatives claimed that the couple were merely “friends” or “great
companions.”9
Despite Bill’s clear desire to bequeath the building to Tom, his donative
intent was not fulfilled. This outcome is anathema to the guiding principle of
inheritance law: the freedom of disposition.10 This principle dictates that one’s
property after death should be allocated as the decedent would have wanted,
with a few narrow exceptions. Freedom of disposition is so well-entrenched in
our law that one is generally empowered to disinherit one’s children,11 leave
millions of dollars to a pet rather than to human relatives,12 or condition
inheritance on marrying a nice Jewish girl.13 This case thus represents an
instance of donative error, or a situation in which the legal system’s outcome
deviates from an individual’s donative intent, and not because some contrary
principle requires that result.14 Unfortunately, these failures to honor donative
intent are not unusual.15 Many courts reject wills on technicalities and refuse to
correct obvious drafting mistakes by testators.16

9.
10.
11.
12.

13.

14.
15.

16.

Schwartz, Tom’s attorney, the case may now fortunately be coming to an acceptable
settlement. See Scoopy’s Notebook, Week of July 13, 2017, VILLAGER (July 13, 2017),
http://thevillager.com/2017/07/13/scoopys-notebook-week-of-july-13-2017
[https://perma.cc/6PNG-FRJT].
See Nir, supra note 1.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“The organizing principle of the American law of donative
transfers is freedom of disposition.”).
See ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 564 (10th ed.
2017) (“In all states except Louisiana, a child or other descendant has no statutory
protection against intentional disinheritance by a parent.”).
See Cara Buckley, Cosseted Life and Secret End of a Millionaire Maltese, N.Y. TIMES (June 9,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/10/nyregion/leona-helmsleys-millionaire-dogtrouble-is-dead.html (discussing the story of Leona Helmsley, who left $12 million to her
dog, Trouble, while disinheriting two of her grandsons).
See, e.g., In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888, 905–06 (Ill. 2009) (holding that a trust
provision that conditioned distributions on marrying within the Jewish faith was valid);
Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825, 828, 832 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1974) (holding
that a similar requirement in a testator’s will was valid).
See infra Part I.A.
See, e.g., In re Estate of Patrick, 728 N.Y.S.2d 354, 354 (Sur. Ct. 2001) (refusing to reform a
will even though it was based on a mistake of fact); Stevens v. Casdorph, 508 S.E.2d 610,
613 (W. Va. 1998) (rejecting a will because the witnesses did not sign the will in each
other’s presence).
See Pamela R. Champine, My Will Be Done: Accommodating the Erring and the Atypical
Testator, 80 NEB. L. REV. 387, 407–26 (2001) (surveying the seven classes of cases in which
courts refuse to correct drafting mistakes); C. Douglas Miller, Will Formality, Judicial
Formalism, and Legislative Reform: An Examination of the New Uniform Probate Code
“Harmless Error” Rule and the Movement Toward Amorphism, 43 FLA. L. REV. 599, 712
(1991) (“Insistence on strict compliance with the wills formalities has demonstrably
produced cases that seem not only harsh and unfair, but absurd.”).
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The probate system’s embrace of formalism, or rigid adherence to rulelike directives, is a primary culprit for this situation.17 In Bill and Tom’s case,
having one witness instead of two made the difference between having a legally
valid will and a legally irrelevant document. The distinction between a
marriage ceremony and a five-decades-long relationship made the
difference between Tom’s inheriting the entire estate, as dictated by New
York intestacy law, and Tom’s having no inheritance rights.18 Moreover,
these formalistic doctrines interact in significant ways with an individual’s
social and economic context. For example, Bill’s lack of knowledge of
inheritance law doctrines meant that he could not express his donative intent in
a way that was intelligible to the legal system. If his lack of an attorney were due
to insufficient resources to hire one, then his economic position also
contributed to the outcome.
The central claim of this Article is that formalistic wills doctrines
should be reformed because they create unjustified inequalities in the
distribution of donative errors.19 Formalism is harmful in this context
because it produces donative errors that often fall on those who do not
deserve them and who are already experiencing other forms of social or
economic disadvantage.20 In other words, those who make a good faith effort
to engage in will execution, albeit imperfectly, should not be punished because
they lack specialized legal knowledge or the economic resources to hire a skilled
attorney to navigate the legal system.21
This Article therefore presents a novel rationale for wills reform. While
many scholars have critiqued the intent-defeating effects of formalism,22 none
have examined the resulting distribution of donative errors or connected it to
broader social and economic inequalities.23 Similarly, while distributive issues
have been on the mind of law reformers, these concerns have not been

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

23.

See infra Part I.B.
See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1 (McKinney 2012) (noting that in the absence
of a spouse, the estate will go to blood relatives).
See infra Part II.C.1.
See infra Part II.C.2.
See infra Part II.C.3.
See, e.g., Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains, and Form, 64 IND. L.J. 155, 159 (1989) (“Yet it is
widely recognized that in reality, formalities often defeat donative intent.”); James
Lindgren, The Fall of Formalism, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1009, 1010 (1992) (“I will then point out
that, when formalism falls, intent rises.”).
See Bridget J. Crawford & Anthony C. Infanti, A Critical Research Agenda for Wills, Trusts,
and Estates, 49 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 317, 340 (2014) (“Surprisingly, however, there is
a paucity of work exploring the class-based aspects of the law of wills, trusts, and estates.”).
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articulated in a consistent way in the legal literature.24 This Article fills the gap
in the inheritance law scholarship by developing the distributive critique of
probate formalism.25 While this project draws on egalitarian theories of
distributive justice, the distributive analysis is not in tension with the traditional
efficiency-based analyses in the literature.26 Because satisfaction of donative
intent is a non-scarce good and a significant portion of donative errors likely
fall on the less well-off members of the donor population, wills reform holds the
promise of decreasing overall donative errors—increasing the efficiency of the
probate system—while also reducing unjustified inequalities in the distribution
of those errors.
A focus on distributive concerns highlights a new dimension in
inheritance law scholarship and practice, which has typically focused on those
who have the most wealth in society.27 This focus makes sense insofar as the
wealthy have significant property to transmit and so can retain attorneys for
that task. But the donor population is heterogeneous, and many middle-class
individuals make arrangements for property after their deaths, even if that
property is more modest—for example, a small family home or a collection of
heirlooms.28 With this population in mind, the Article suggests a host of legal
reforms supported by this distributive analysis, reforms which revolve around
simplifying will execution and enabling judicial discretion to facilitate donative
intent.29
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides the theoretical
background for the argument. It discusses the principles of freedom of
disposition and formalism, explores the sources of donative error, and explains
the need for a distributive analysis in inheritance law scholarship. Part II lays
out the specifics of the distributive analysis. It identifies the good at issue, the
relevant population, and the distributive principles of equality, desert, and priority
24.

25.
26.
27.

28.
29.

See Iris J. Goodwin, Access to Justice: What to Do About the Law of Wills, 2016 WIS. L. REV.
947, 951–53 (putting wills law in the context of broader reform efforts to provide access to
justice); John H. Langbein, Richard Wellman and the Reform of American Probate Law, 40
GA. L. REV. 1093, 1093–94 (2006) (describing how Wellman, a great law reformer in
inheritance law, sought to make probate easier for American families).
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part II.A, III.B.
See Naomi Cahn & Amy Ziettlow, “Making Things Fair”: An Empirical Study of How
People Approach the Wealth Transmission System, 22 ELDER L.J. 325, 328 (2015) (“Trusts
and estates practice is oriented to serve the archetypal individual who needs financial
planning: a person who is upper middle class—or wealthy—and is seeking to dispose of
assets upon death (and can pay legal bills).”).
See Goodwin, supra note 24, at 954–56 (discussing the many ways in which estate planning
is important for low- and middle-income families).
See infra Part III.B.
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that are employed in the analysis. Part III applies this framework to donative intent
in the inheritance system. It examines and critiques the current distribution of
donative errors, and it concludes by suggesting several avenues for legal reform.
I.

PRINCIPLES AND THE PROBATE SYSTEM

This Part provides the legal and social background for understanding the
inheritance system and the need for a distributive analysis. Subpart I.A
discusses the importance of the freedom of disposition to the inheritance
system and introduces the key concepts of donative intent and donative error.
Subpart I.B examines formalism and how the formalistic legal environment
interacts with an individual’s internal characteristics, external resources, and
social environment to create either a successful or unsuccessful will execution.
Subpart I.C describes the need for a distributive analysis in inheritance law, as
such analyses are rare in existing scholarship.
A.

Freedom of Disposition

The freedom of disposition is the governing principle of American inheritance
law.30 This freedom is best understood as a property right—the right to transmit
property after death—one of the many in the bundle of property “sticks” that one
might possess.31 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized this right as being on par
with the right to exclude, highlighting its importance in our jurisprudence.32

30.

31.
32.

See In re Caruthers’ Estate, 151 S.W.2d 946, 948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) (“A testator’s
right to bestow his property by will at death is as absolute as his right to convey it
during his life time.”); John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance With the Wills Act,
88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1975) (“[V]irtually the entire law of wills derives from the
premise that an owner is entitled to dispose of his property as he pleases in death as in
life.” (citing In re Caruthers’ Estate, 151 S.W.2d 948)); see also Adam J. Hirsch &
William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 5–14
(1992) (discussing the various rationales advanced to justify the freedom of
disposition).
See J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711,
712–13 (1996) (noting that the dominant metaphor of property law is the bundle of
sticks).
See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716–17 (1987) (making the comparison to the right
to exclude and holding that the regulation of the right to transmit wealth raises
constitutional issues in the context of takings); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the
Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 740 (1998) (arguing that the right to exclude is
fundamental to property law).
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Compared to the rest of the world, the United States is an outlier on this
front.33
The freedom of disposition, however, is not absolute, even in the United
States.34 There are temporal limits on how long one can exert dead-hand
control over property, provided primarily by the Rule Against Perpetuities.35
Another limit revolves around family protection: While children are not
protected from disinheritance, spouses can often claim a share of a deceased
spouse’s estate, even if the decedent tried to disinherit them.36 And for the
extremely wealthy, the state is able to take a share of a decedent’s wealth against
her will through estate, gift, and generation-skipping transfer taxes.37 These are
exceptions, each of which embodies a different policy that overrules the
freedom of disposition in particular circumstances. Yet, in the absence of a
testator’s attempt to control property for a long time, to disinherit a spouse, or
to plan for estate taxes, the freedom of disposition still reigns supreme.
The supremacy of the freedom of disposition has led inheritance law to be
almost singularly focused on donative intent, or the testator’s desires with
respect to the gift, including its amount, terms, and recipients.38 While intentbased inquiries are certainly not unique to this area of law, they perhaps do not

33.
34.

35.

36.
37.

38.

See Deborah A. Batts, I Didn’t Ask to Be Born: The American Law of Disinheritance and a
Proposal for Change to a System of Protected Inheritance, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1197, 1198
(1990) (noting that many countries protect children from disinheritance).
See Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of the Living, the Law of the Dead: Property,
Succession, and Society, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 340, 355 (“Arguably, freedom of testation must
be limited in order to preserve the very principle which supports it—the market or
property principle.”).
See JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (Roland Gray ed., 4th ed.
1942) (stating the orthodox form of the rule: “No interest is good unless it must vest, if at
all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest”);
Robert J. Lynn, Perpetuities Literacy for the 21st Century, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 219, 219 (1989)
(noting that the Rule invalidates will or trust provisions regardless of settlor or testator
intent). Even this limit is falling by the wayside as many states move to abolish the Rule in
certain contexts. See Reid Kress Weisbord, Trust Term Extension, 67 FLA. L. REV. 73, 81
(2015) (discussing the move by many jurisdictions to abrogate or repeal the Rule).
See, e.g., 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-8 (2016) (giving the spouse one-third of the estate if there
is a descendant of the decedent and one-half of the estate if there is not).
See 26 U.S.C. § 2001(a) (Supp. 2017) (“A tax is hereby imposed on the transfer of the
taxable estate of every decedent who is a citizen or resident of the United States.”); id. §
2601 (“A tax is hereby imposed on every generation-skipping transfer . . . .”); James R.
Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 825–27 (2001) (justifying
the estate tax as promoting democratic values).
See Houts v. Jameson, 201 N.W.2d 466, 468 (Iowa 1972) (“[T]he testator’s intent is the
polestar and must prevail . . . .”); In re Gustafson, 547 N.E.2d 1152, 1153 (N.Y. 1989) (“[The
court’s] primary function is to effectuate the testator’s intent . . . .”); Dainton v. Watson,
658 P.2d 79, 81 (Wyo. 1983) (“In the first place, in considering a will, it is the long-accepted
position of this court that intent of the testator must govern.”).

332

65 UCLA L. R EV. 324 (2018)

receive as strong of an emphasis elsewhere.39 What makes the task of
discovering donative intent complex in this context is clear—the donor is dead
and so cannot explain what she wants done with her property.40 She must speak
through legal documents, such as wills and trusts, or her voice must be
presumed through default rules contained in the intestacy regime.41 Thus,
much turns on interpreting these documents and constructing these default
rules.
Put another way, the tasks of interpretation and construction are aimed at
reducing donative errors. A donative error is a situation in which an outcome
of the legal system deviates from an individual’s donative intent, and not
because an accepted contrary principle demands that result. For example, if an
estate is distributed according to the dictates of a forged will that does not
reflect the decedent’s intent, then there is donative error.42 The legal system has
failed to prevent that will from governing the distribution of the estate, and no
contrary principle supports probating forged wills. In contrast, when part of an
estate is distributed to the government in the form of estate taxes, this does not
constitute a donative error, even if the decedent did not want that result. The
taxation of wealth runs counter to donative intent in most cases, although it is
an accepted contrary principle of the legal system. Therefore, the legal system is
functioning as intended.
Donative error primarily harms the deceased by violating her right to
dispose of her property as she wishes after death, but it may secondarily harm
those who expect to receive the property but do not, as was the case in the
Introduction’s example. It also constitutes the unjust enrichment of those who

39.

40.
41.

42.

See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 657, 657–58
(2001) (examining the role of intent in antitrust law); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 886–87 (1985) (examining the
intent of the Founders with respect to originalist constitutional analysis).
See Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51
YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1941) (“[T]he testator will inevitably be dead and therefore unable to testify
when the issue is tried.”).
See John H. Langbein, Will Contests, 103 YALE L.J. 2039, 2044 (1994) (reviewing DAVID
MARGOLICK, UNDUE INFLUENCE: THE EPIC BATTLE FOR THE JOHNSON & JOHNSON FORTUNE
(1993)) (“[O]ur probate procedure follows a ‘worst evidence’ rule. We insist that the
testator be dead before we investigate the question whether he had capacity when he was
alive”).
Donative errors vary in magnitude. For example, if an individual intends to leave all of her
money to a spouse, and it is indeed all left to a spouse, then her donative intent is perfectly
satisfied. If, however, half of that money is left to charity instead, her donative intent is
only partially satisfied. This outcome is nonetheless superior to having all of the money
left to charity, an outcome that would in no way satisfy the individual’s donative intent.
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receive the property because of the donative error.43 Despite this panoply of
potential harms, it is often difficult to determine whether there is actual donative
error, as the decedent is unable to comment on the situation. Thus, as is the case
with discerning donative intent in general, we must infer when there likely is
donative error by using contextual factual information, the probable sources
of donative error, and the (unfortunately) limited, but growing, empirical
research on testation.44
Despite this lack of solid empirical grounding, legal architects try their
best to construct a system that actualizes donative intent and avoids donative
error. The next Subpart surveys the resultant legal architecture and its defining
feature: formalism.
B.

Formalism and Donative Error

Formalism is a demanding doctrine. It compels a rule-based law, where
the language of rules trumps the policies they embody.45 It also requires legal
decisionmakers to strictly follow these rules even if it might not make sense in
the individual case.46 While seemingly draconian, rule-based formalism has
several virtues. One virtue is its predictability; if the law is straightforward and

43.

44.

45.

46.

See In re Estate of Tolin, 622 So.2d 988, 990 (Fla. 1993) (“A constructive trust is properly
imposed when, as a result of a mistake in a transaction, one party is unjustly enriched at the
expense of another.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §
1 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (discussing the nature of unjust enrichment and
restitution); John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the
Ground of Mistake: Change of Direction in American Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 521, 524–25
(1982) (noting the unjust enrichment implications of courts’ permitting errors to go
unfixed).
See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, TRUSTS, AND
INHERITANCE LAW 5–6 (2009) (noting the relative lack of empirical work in this area);
Thomas E. Simmons, Wills Above Ground, 23 ELDER L.J. 343, 354 n.53–54 (2016)
(collecting the empirical studies of probate files).
Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988) (“At the heart of the word
‘formalism,’ in many of its numerous uses, lies the concept of decisionmaking according to
rule. Formalism . . . screen[s] off from a decisionmaker factors that a sensitive
decisionmaker would otherwise take into account.”). The alternative, of course, would be
to employ standards. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1688 (1976) (“At the opposite pole from a formally
realizable rule is a standard or principle or policy. A standard refers directly to one of the
substantive objectives of the legal order.”).
See Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636,
638 (1999) (describing the three formalist strategies as “promoting compliance with all
applicable legal formalities (whether or not they make sense in the individual case),”
“ensuring rule-bound law (even if application of the rule, statutory or contractual, makes
little sense in the individual case),” and “constraining the discretion of judges in deciding
cases”).
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not subject to judicial discretion, individuals are able to plan their behavior and
have their expectations satisfied accordingly.47 The second virtue of rule-based
formalism is that rules are low-cost for judges to apply, as they do not require
consideration and application of background policies to each individual case.48
In addition, formalists generally prefer that a court confine its analysis to the
four corners of the relevant legal document rather than examining extrinsic
evidence, which also preserves judicial resources in many cases.49
Formalism manifests in several ways in the probate system, the public
system governing the transfer of property upon death and the focus of this
Article.50 This system is overseen by probate courts, which have jurisdiction
over the distribution of the decedent’s property whether she died intestate
(without a will) or testate (with one).51 In the case of intestacy, formalism is

47.

48.
49.

50.

51.

See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989)
(lauding the predictability of rules). This value is at its apogee when the legal system
contains repeat players who will benefit from the predictability over repeated interactions,
such as with contracts between sophisticated business entities. See Meredith R. Miller,
Contract Law, Party Sophistication and the New Formalism, 75 MO. L. REV. 493, 532 (2010)
(“If the contract involves two repeat players, adherence to formalism is appropriate . . . .”).
This is, notably, not the situation in inheritance law, where there is by definition only one
death and administration of the estate.
See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 585
(1992) (describing how rules are lower cost when they are applied to multiple cases,
making ex ante information gathering more efficient).
See In re Estate of Kime, 193 Cal. Rptr. 718, 727–28 (Ct. App. 1983) (discussing the
historical tension between formalism and donative intent). This is a dispute that is not
unique to the law of wills. See Larry A. DiMatteo, Reason and Context: A Dual Track
Theory of Interpretation, 109 PA. ST. L. REV. 397, 398–99 (2004) (noting how contextual
and formalistic theories clash in the law of contracts as well).
This is not to downplay the importance of the private nonprobate system, which
encompasses assets such as life insurance, retirement accounts, joint accounts, and
revocable trusts. See John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the
Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1109 (1984) (listing these as the “pure” will
substitutes, in contrast to joint tenancies). More wealth actually passes through these types
of legal instruments than through the probate system. See Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and
Estates: Implementing Freedom of Disposition, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 643, 654 (2014).
However, the probate system may hold several advantages for the middle-income families
that are the focus on this Article. See David Horton, In Partial Defense of Probate: Evidence
From Alameda County, California, 103 GEO. L.J. 605, 652–55 (2015) (describing the
potential advantages of probate as compared to trusts). Further, the nonprobate system
lacks the formalism of the probate system and thus raises different issues that are beyond
the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Melanie B. Leslie & Stewart E. Sterk, Revisiting the
Revolution: Reintegrating the Wealth Transmission System, 56 B.C. L. REV. 61, 81–110
(2015) (discussing fragmentation problems in the nonprobate system).
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-302 (amended 2010) (describing the subject matter
jurisdiction of probate courts as encompassing decedent’s estates, trusts, and the
protection of minors and incapacitated persons); Grayson M.P. McCouch, Probate Law
Reform and Nonprobate Transfers, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 757, 758 (2008) (“Broadly
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evident in states’ intestacy statutes. These statutes provide sets of default rules
dictating how the estate should be distributed when there is no will.52 These
rules, in turn, aim to mimic what a decedent would have wanted had she
written a will, in order to maximize satisfaction of her presumed donative
intent.53 Intestacy codes normally dictate that property flow to those related to
the decedent by blood, adoption, or marriage, with most statutes distributing
assets first to a spouse, followed by descendants, ancestors, and collateral
kindred, such as cousins and aunts.54 These statutes are notoriously rigid. An
individual who does not fit into one of the statutorily-defined categories of
family receives nothing from the decedent’s estate, even if the decedent would
have considered that individual to be family.55 In other words, courts do not
typically inquire into the nature of the decedent’s relationships to determine
whether the decedent actually would have wanted her property to pass on to
other individuals not listed in the intestacy statute.56

52.

53.

54.

55.

56.

speaking, probate refers to the body of substantive and procedural rules that govern the
devolution of decedents’ estates by will or intestacy.”).
See Dampier v. Williams, 493 S.W.3d 118, 124 (Tex. App. 2016) (“Intestacy law provides
the default rules on how ‘to distribute an intestate decedent’s estate according to which of
his heirs survive him.’” (quoting Kirkpatrick v. Estate of Kane, 743 S.W.2d 371, 372 (Tex.
App. 1988))); Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its
Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1036 (2004) (calling intestacy rules “the quintessential
default rule in the inheritance field”).
See King v. Riffee, 309 S.E.2d 85, 87–88 (W. Va. 1983) (“The purpose of these statutes,
then, is to provide a distribution of real and personal property that approximates what
decedents would have done if they had made a will.”). In the past, intestacy formalism was
also seen as a way of protecting the family. See Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to
Changing Families, 18 L. & INEQ. 1, 27 (2000) (“Intestacy statutes attempt to distribute a
decedent’s property to the decedent’s family, either because the intestacy statute strives to
approximate the decedent’s wishes or because society has decided that intestacy statutes
should benefit and strengthen families if a decedent does not express a contrary wish in a
will.” (footnote omitted)).
See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 134.030–134.210 (2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-2-104 (2015);
see also RALPH C. BRASHIER, INHERITANCE LAW AND THE EVOLVING FAMILY 4 (2004) (noting
the “universal inclusion of the surviving spouse” in intestacy); Katharine K. Baker,
Legitimate Families and Equal Protection, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1647, 1679 (2015) (“[In] intestacy
statutes, the state delineates classes of people who are entitled to some right by virtue of
their family connection to the person or incident at issue.”).
This rigidity has been tempered by the increasing complexity of such statutes, to account
for the wider number of acceptable family forms. See Frances H. Foster, The Family
Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 199, 228–30 (2001) (describing various ways
in which scholars have attempted to expand family definitions to reflect modern families).
The largest exception to this is the slayer rule, which prevents individuals who killed the
decedent from acquiring property under intestacy. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
11.84.020 (West Supp. 2017) (“No slayer or abuser shall in any way acquire any property or
receive any benefit as the result of the death of the decedent . . . .”); In re Estate of Mahoney,
220 A.2d 475, 477 (Vt. 1966) (applying the slayer rule in the form of an equitable
principle).
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Assuming a property owner knows the default rules of distribution and
disagrees with them, she may write a will to opt out of that default regime.
There are, however, a variety of formalistic legal rules that govern the
execution and construction of wills as well.57 For example, all states require
that a will be executed with certain formalities to be valid, typically including
at least a writing, signature, and attestation by two witnesses.58 This type of
wills formalism was initially seen as protective of donative intent because it
prevented the admission of fraudulent documents purporting to be wills.59
As a result, courts applied a strict compliance rule in enforcing these
requirements, and many states continue to do so.60 Unfortunately, in many
cases such strict compliance has actually undermined donative intent. For
example, courts reject wills on technicalities, as in the example in the
Introduction, where the execution of a will with only one witness proved
fatal even though there was no serious dispute as to the document’s
authenticity. Cases like these have helped turn scholarly opinion against

57.
58.

59.

See David Horton, Tomorrow’s Inheritance: The Frontiers of Estate Planning Formalism, 58
B.C. L. REV. 539, 554–56 (2017) (describing the Wills Act of 1837, 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26 (Eng.),
and this history of formalism).
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-606 (2005) (“Every will . . . shall be in writing, and signed at
the end by the party making the will . . . . Such will shall be attested and subscribed in the
presence of such party by two or more competent witnesses . . . .”); James Lindgren,
Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for Wills, 68 N.C. L. REV. 541, 550 (1990) (noting
how these three requirements have persisted in various forms). These formalities have
value, as they serve various functions for the legal system. See Alexander A. Boni-Saenz,
Sexual Advance Directives, 68 ALA. L. REV. 1, 34–36 (2016) (summarizing the various
functional arguments).
As one court explained:
The purpose of the statutory requirements with respect to the execution of wills
was to throw every safeguard deemed necessary around a testator while in the
performance of this important act, and to prevent the probate of a fraudulent and
supposititious will instead of the real one. To effectually accomplish this, the statute
must be strictly followed.

60.

Savage v. Bowen, 49 S.E. 668, 669 (Va. 1905).
See SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 11, at 176 & n.56 (noting that only eleven states
have adopted harmless error by statute and that many limit its application to only certain
types of errors); see, e.g., Stevens v. Casdorph, 508 S.E.2d 610, 613 (W. Va. 1998) (rejecting
a will because the witnesses did not sign the will in each other’s presence). Sometimes,
however, courts provide ad hoc relief from the strict compliance rule. See, e.g., In re Snide,
418 N.E.2d 656, 658 (N.Y. 1981) (excusing the mistakes of a married couple who
accidentally signed each other’s wills); Peter T. Wendel, Wills Act Compliance and the
Harmless Error Approach: Flawed Narrative Equals Flawed Analysis?, 95 OR. L. REV. 337,
376 (2017) (questioning whether strict compliance is in fact very strict in practice). This is
an insufficient solution, however, as it leads to inconsistent results and uncertainty about
how courts might adjudicate future wills disputes.
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formalism, and it is now seen as a force for defeating rather than actualizing
donative intent.61
Once a will has been deemed valid, formalism still guides courts’ efforts at
will construction.62 Here, many courts apply a combination of the plain
meaning rule, which bars the consideration of extrinsic evidence that alters the
plain meaning of the will’s text, and the no reformation rule, which prevents
reforming the words of a will even if reformation would correct obvious
mistakes or typos in will drafting.63 For example, in the case of In re Patrick,64
the testator executed a will giving his house to his daughter, on the belief that
she was the only one of his children who did not own her home.65 He even
signed an affidavit on the day of the will execution explaining that this was his
sole reason for doing so.66 Yet he was mistaken: Two of his other children also
did not own their homes. The court refused to correct the mistake, saying that
it was obliged to examine only the words of the will, which were clear and
unambiguous.67 Many courts in other jurisdictions would render the same
outcome in this case, as only a minority of states give courts the power to
reform wills.68

61.
62.

63.

64.
65.
66.
67.

68.

See David Horton, Wills Law on the Ground, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1094, 1112–20 (2015)
(describing the historical scholarly turn against formalism and the subsequent problems
integrating nonformalist reforms into a formalist field).
See Joseph W. deFuria, Jr., Mistakes in Wills Resulting From Scriveners’ Errors: The
Argument for Reformation, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1990) (“Testators would be shocked to
learn that relatively ‘minor’ scriveners’ errors can completely thwart their last wishes.”
(footnote omitted)).
See, e.g., Burnett v. First Commercial Tr. Co., 939 S.W.2d 827, 829–30 (Ark. 1997)
(refusing to reform will to correct a clerical error that resulted in partial intestacy);
MacKinnon v. Advance Pattern Co., 123 N.E.2d 89, 89 (N.Y. 1954) (mem.) (refusing to
admit extrinsic evidence to vary the will’s plain meaning and intent). Sometimes, courts
provide ad hoc relief from this plain meaning rule, just as they do in the will execution
context, but with similar problems. See, e.g., In re Estate of Gibbs, 111 N.W.2d 413, 418
(Wis. 1961) (concluding that the court could ignore “details of identification” in a will).
728 N.Y.S.2d 354 (Sur. Ct. 2001).
Id. at 354.
Id.
Id. at 355 (“[T]o reform a will that has no ambiguities results in a will that is not that of the
decedent. When the words used in a will are clear and definite there is no power to change
them.” (citing In re Watson, 186 N.E. 787, 789 (N.Y. 1933))). Of course we cannot know
with certainty what the testator would have done if he had known about his other
children’s property ownership, but his stated reasons for the disposition clearly did not
apply to the disposition he made.
See, e.g., Noble v. Bruce, 709 A.2d 1264, 1277 (Md. 1998) (noting “the longstanding rule in
this state against the reformation of wills” (citing Shriners Hosps. v. Md. Nat’l Bank, 312
A.2d 546, 555 (1973))); Flannery v. McNamara, 738 N.E.2d 739, 745 (Mass. 2000)
(“Reformation of wills is presently prohibited in Massachusetts.”); In re Lyons Marital Tr.,
717 N.W.2d 457, 462 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (“[T]here is no authority for the Minnesota
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Thus, formalism can contribute to donative error, but it is only one part of
a broader picture. The ability to create a valid will is the product not only of the
background legal environment but also of several other factors, including a
testator’s internal characteristics, external resources, and social environment.69
These factors interact in dynamic ways with the legal context, but each also
holds independent importance. With regard to internal characteristics, one
must have the capacity to form donative preferences and the motivation to
fulfill those preferences by creating a will.70 Possessing that motivation is no
small feat in this context; laziness, procrastination, and discomfort confronting
topics such as disability and death can easily defeat an attempt at estate
planning.71 Therefore, some degree of mental fortitude is required to think
through and operationalize one’s donative preferences. The failure to do so has
consequences—donative error. It produces donative errors when there is a
mismatch between an individual’s donative preferences and the law’s intestacy
provisions. Alternatively, donative errors may also be generated when a
testator fails to diligently update her will once her preferences or property
interests change.72
One may have the motivation to engage in estate planning but lack the
resources to do so effectively, as a free-floating preference will not be actualized

69.

70.

courts to reform an unambiguous will.”); Sitkoff, supra note 50, at 651–52 (“[A] minority
but growing number of courts permit recourse to extrinsic evidence to clarify and even
reform the terms of a will.”). For an example of the modern trend, see In re Estate of Duke,
352 P.3d 863, 865 (Cal. 2015), which states: “We conclude that the categorical bar on
reformation of wills is not justified . . . .”.
See Elizabeth Anderson, Justifying the Capabilities Approach to Justice, in MEASURING
JUSTICE: PRIMARY GOODS AND CAPABILITIES 81, 96 (Harry Brighouse & Ingrid Robeyns eds.,
2010) (noting that a given person’s capabilities are a “product of her internal endowments,
her external resources, and the social and physical environment in which she lives”).
The capacity element is understood by the legal system as a test of one’s capacity to make a
will. For example, one court noted:
[A] testatrix possesses the capacity to make a will if, at the time of executing it, she
understands that a will is intended to dispose of her property after her death, is
capable of remembering generally what property and persons related to her are
subject to the will’s disposition, and is capable of setting forth an intelligent scheme to
dispose of her property.

71.

72.

Patterson-Fowlkes v. Chancey, 732 S.E.2d 252, 253 (Ga. 2012) (citing Strong v. Holden,
697 S.E.2d 189 (2010)).
See Michael R. McCunney & Alyssa A. DiRusso, Marketing Wills, 16 ELDER L.J. 33, 35
(2008) (discussing reasons why people do not execute wills). Further, these unfortunate
tendencies are not the province of any particular economic group. See Horton, supra note
61, at 1123 (suggesting that intestacy affects estates regardless of the size of the estate).
See Mark Eghari, 6 Reasons to Revise Your Estate Plan as Soon as Possible, FORBES (Jan. 2,
2017, 12:31 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/markeghrari/2017/01/02/6-reasons-torevise-your-estate-plan-as-soon-as-possible [http://perma.cc/7RZM-5CDF] (describing
the various circumstances in which an estate plan might need updating).
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on its own. One important resource is the specialized legal knowledge about
formalistic inheritance law doctrines. This includes not only substantive
knowledge of the body of law in a given state but also knowledge of how to
communicate one’s donative preferences in a way that is intelligible to that
state’s probate system. For example, the layperson may not know that it is best
practice to include a residuary clause in a will to account for all property that
she might own at death.73 This is because donors are one-time players in the
game of life and death, and so lack the experience to know the various rules that
apply or contingencies that might arise.74 Thus, this type of knowledge is likely
to be rare in the population.75 The Internet may help to bridge this gap by
providing access to estate planning forms that an individual can fill out.
However, in a formalistic legal environment that is unforgiving of mistakes by
lay estate planners, these forms will be, at best, an incomplete substitute for
knowledge of the law and how it might interact with the substance of those
forms.76
If one does not have the necessary legal knowledge, there is always the
option of hiring an attorney. But attorneys must be paid, and the market rates
for legal services put them out of reach for many middle-class households.77
Even without the economic resources to hire an attorney, a person may have a
qualified lawyer who is a friend or family member in her social network. With
luck, that individual may be willing to work for free. Consequently, one’s social

73.
74.

75.

76.
77.

See Cook v. Estate of Seeman, 858 S.W.2d 114, 115 (Ark. 1993) (holding that a will lacking
a residuary clause resulted in partial intestacy).
See Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals Opt Out of Intestacy, 53
B.C. L. REV. 877, 879 (2012) (“Unlike other acts of legal significance, such as entering into a
marriage or consumer contract, the will-making process is unfamiliar to most individuals
and requires legal draftsmanship and compliance with testamentary formalities.”).
See Arden Rowell, Legal Rules, Beliefs, and Aspirations 1 (Oct. 14, 2017) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2903049 (noting that
the general population tends to conflate formal legal rules with subjective legal beliefs and
normative legal aspirations). Knowledge of the inheritance system may even be
uncommon among the lawyer population, as attorneys frequently specialize heavily in
their own areas. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 803 (1983) (“[W]ith
the dramatic growth of available knowledge, it is becoming increasingly difficult for any
individual to be proficient—or even competent—in all fields.”).
See Wendy S. Goffe & Rochelle L. Haller, From Zoom to Doom? Risks of Do-It-Yourself
Estate Planning, EST. PLAN., Aug. 2011, at 27, 28–30 (detailing some of the pitfalls of estate
planning using Internet resources).
See Luz E. Herrera, Rethinking Private Attorney Involvement Through a “Low Bono” Lens,
43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 2 (2009) (“Millions of people in our country who do not qualify for
subsidized civil legal services, but who do not make enough money to hire an attorney at
market rates of $200 to $350 an hour, have few means of obtaining adequate
representation for the myriad of unavoidable legal problems they routinely encounter.”).
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environment may be able to overcome one’s lack of financial means in certain
circumstances.
There is, however, a dark side to leveraging one’s social environment for
estate planning. Despite having the motivation or resources to execute a valid
will, one might still fall prey to third-party wrongdoing or negligence.
Wrongdoing may be overt, such as threats and intimidation to create a will that
does not comport with one’s wishes.78 Alternatively, a third party might act
subtly, influencing or deceiving a vulnerable individual to execute a will that
does not reflect her donative intent.79 Or third parties might act after the
decedent’s death, by trying to pass off a document as a valid will when it is not
or by trying to destroy a valid will that is not favorable to them.80 It is also
possible that, even absent intentional wrongdoing, a retained attorney was not
competent or diligent in carrying out her duties, making errors in the drafting
or execution of the will.81 In fact, many of the cases in which there is clear
donative error fall into this category.82 The third-party conduct in these cases is
not intentional, but it still creates donative error. Yet many courts will not
correct the mistake. Such mistakes are less likely to plague higher-income
individuals, who can retain skilled trusts and estates attorneys, but middleincome households have to rely on general practitioners who may be more
prone to error.83
Thus, given a formalistic legal environment, donative errors can have
many sources. First, donative errors can arise from a lack of engagement with

78.
79.
80.

81.
82.
83.

See, e.g., Pope v. Garrett, 211 S.W.2d 559, 560 (Tex. 1948) (noting that heirs exerted
“physical force” or created a “disturbance” to prevent the decedent from executing a will in
favor of her friend).
See, e.g., McDaniel v. McDaniel, 707 S.E.2d 60, 61–63 (Ga. 2011) (describing how one son
took advantage of his elderly’s father weak mental state and lied to him so that he would
disinherit his other son).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.1
cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 1999) (discussing the presumption that a testator is considered to
have revoked a will that cannot be found after death if the will was last known to be in the
testator’s possession, a presumption that unscrupulous relatives could use to their
advantage).
See, e.g., Simpson v. Calivas, 650 A.2d 318, 320–21 (N.H. 1994) (describing an attorney
who imprecisely described real property in the will, causing an unintended disposition).
See Jane B. Baron, Irresolute Testators, Clear and Convincing Wills Law, 73 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 3, 33–37, 45–48 (2016) (discussing seminal cases of the application of harmless error,
in which the testator had the benefit of counsel).
See Mark A. Armitage, Regulating Competence, 52 EMORY L.J. 1103, 1103 (2003) (noting
that failures of diligence and competence often go hand in hand); Roger C. Cramton,
Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 596 (1994)
(describing how many people have to “‘lump it’ on many legal matters and get low-cost or
minimal representation on many others”).
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the estate planning process, which may lead to errors if there is a mismatch
between the dictates of the intestacy statute and the decedent’s donative
intent.84 Second, they can derive from a lack of personal knowledge of
inheritance law and the lack of a knowledgeable attorney. These are costly
errors because wills may be misconstrued by the probate courts or rejected for
failing to comply with formalities. Third, donative errors can come from a
third party, such as a family member or incompetent attorney, who interfered
with or mishandled the estate planning process in a way that warped or
misrepresented donative intent. Donative errors flow here in two possible
ways: Either the resulting will does not reflect actual donative preferences, or it
does but will nonetheless be rejected or misconstrued by the court.
Formalism is a primary contributor to donative errors, but it interacts in
significant ways with background social and economic conditions that are
often unequal. The next Subpart surveys the existing scholarly literature on
formalism and donative intent, identifies a lack of distributive analyses in that
literature, and argues that such an analysis is needed.
C.

The Need for a Distributive Analysis

The probate system’s embrace of formalism is clearly in tension with its
emphasis on donor intent.85 Scholars of different stripes have pointed this out
and critiqued the legal system for its inefficiency, as it increases the overall
number of donative errors.86 Early scholars and reformers made it their explicit
goal to maximize the legal system’s intent-serving outcomes, or in the language
of this Article, to minimize the number of donative errors.87 Working in a more
doctrinal tradition, they urged courts to transplant doctrines such as substantial
compliance or harmless error to the realm of wills law, which had a strong tie to
formalism that eschewed such approaches.88
84.

85.
86.
87.
88.

See Gary, supra note 53, at 1 (“An analysis of intestacy law must begin with the recognition
that an intestacy statute cannot work equally well for every potential decedent. Indeed,
developing an intestacy statute that will meet the needs or wishes of all persons is both
unnecessary and impossible.”).
See, e.g., In re Estate of Cole, 621 N.W.2d 816, 817–18 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (describing
these as the two “overriding rules” in inheritance law); Baron, supra note 22, at 159;
Lindgren, supra note 22, at 1010.
While there has been strong scholarly consensus on this, it is not unanimous. See, e.g.,
John V. Orth, Wills Act Formalities: How Much Compliance Is Enough?, 43 REAL PROP. TR.
& EST. L.J. 73, 80–81 (2008) (questioning the adoption of a harmless error rule).
See, e.g., Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 43, at 529 (noting that reformation is
supported by the policies of the Wills Act, policies which are meant to be intent-serving).
See John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of Wills: A Report on
Australia’s Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 53–54 (1987)
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Modern scholars working in the law and economics tradition have picked
up the baton and advanced the discussion by focusing on donative intent in
terms of system design and error reduction.89 These scholars have brought the
powerful tool of economic analysis to the conversation, which has helped
clarify the issues at stake and the range of potential reform options. What
unites these two groups of scholars is a focus on efficiency—reducing the
overall number of donative errors and thereby maximizing the realization of
donative intent.
These scholarly accounts have added much to the discussion of donative
intent, but they are incomplete. What is missing is a distributive analysis, or a
normative evaluation of how the relevant legal arrangements “distribut[e]
perceived goods and ills over persons.”90 To date, there has been no sustained
analysis of the distribution of donative errors in the population or of the
connection between those errors and broader distributions of socioeconomic
advantage in the population.91 This Article provides this crucial distributive
analysis by inquiring into who bears the burdens of donative errors in the
probate system.
Those who likely bear this burden have not been the traditional focus of
inheritance law practice or scholarship. Trusts and estates practitioners
typically have clients who are on the wealthier side of the socioeconomic
spectrum, which makes sense insofar as such individuals have significant
property to transmit and so can retain attorneys for that task.92 Inheritance law
scholarship has predictably followed suit, with distributive analyses confined
primarily to discussions of inheritance in the context of taxes and wealth
inequality.93 There has been less scholarly focus on the effects of probate

89.

90.
91.
92.
93.

(advocating for harmless error); Langbein, supra note 30, at 489 (arguing for the
substantial compliance doctrine).
See, e.g., Mark Glover, Minimizing Probate-Error Risk, 49 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 335, 348–
49 (2016) (analyzing will execution doctrines in terms of false positive and false negative
errors); Daniel B. Kelly, Toward Economic Analysis of the Uniform Probate Code, 45 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 855, 862–63 (2012) (urging and performing a more systematic
economic analysis of the Uniform Probate Code); Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs
Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 648–49 (2004) (applying an agency costs
analysis to the law of trusts, using donative intent as the primary value).
See Robert Hockett, Putting Distribution First, 18 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 157, 165
(2017).
See Crawford & Infanti, supra note 23, at 340.
See Cahn & Ziettlow, supra note 27, at 326–27.
See, e.g., Felix B. Chang, Asymmetries in the Generation and Transmission of Wealth, 78
OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2018). For one possible exception, see Adam S. HofriWinogradow, The Stripping of the Trust: A Study in Legal Evolution, U. TORONTO L.J.,
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doctrines on the donative intent of less well-off members of the donor
population, such as those in the middle class.
A focus on this subpopulation is warranted for two reasons. First, the
donor population is heterogeneous in terms of economic resources, rather than
being homogeneously wealthy. The probate property of those in the middle
class might simply be heirlooms or keepsakes, such as an antique ring or a chest
of photos. These can be imbued with sentimental significance, and giving them
away can help the decedent express the meaning of relationships she had
during life.94 But the estate might also consist of modest financial assets such as
a small family home or inheritance from another family member. These assets
can provide stability or economic opportunity for lower-income families, and
their effective transmission through a will can be of utmost importance to the
decedent as well as to her survivors.95 Second, even those of more modest
means may find themselves needing to interact with the inheritance system for
a variety of reasons. The probate system in particular serves many functions
that are useful to middle-class families, including dealing with creditors,96
transferring title to the family home,97 or resolving intrafamilial disputes over
the estate.98 Given the importance of this segment of the population, a goal of
this Article is to provide the theoretical basis for a new direction in inheritance
law scholarship that focuses more on middle-class individuals and their
interactions with the probate system.
While distributive analyses typically play second-fiddle to efficiency
analyses in legal scholarship,99 the lack of any distributive analyses in this

94.

95.
96.
97.

98.
99.

Winter 2015, at 1 , which explores some distributive consequences of trust law reform
efforts.
See Cahn & Ziettlow, supra note 27, at 341–42 (describing how these keepsakes often
constitute a type of “emotional inheritance”); Deborah S. Gordon, Mor[t]ality and Identity:
Wills, Narratives, and Cherished Possessions, 28 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 265, 276–83 (2016)
(describing how “cherished possessions” are intertwined with identity and life narratives).
See Goodwin, supra note 24, at 954–56.
See, e.g., State ex rel. Houska v. Dickhaner, 323 S.W.3d 29, 33 (Mo. 2010) (en banc)
(authorizing the barring of a creditor’s claim after a probate proceeding).
See, e.g., In re Chenoweth, 132 B.R. 161, 164 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1991) (“The purpose of
probate is to establish the legal status of the will and furnish record evidence of the rights to
property existing under the will.” (first citing Ashmore v. Newman, 183 N.E. 1, 8 (1932);
then citing Havill v. Havill, 163 N.E. 428, 430 (1928); and then citing Crooker v. McArdle,
163 N.E. 384, 385 (1928)).
See James N. Zartman, Independent Administration in Illinois, 12 PROB. L.J. OHIO 71, 71
(2002) (noting that the core function of probate courts is to settle disputes).
See Hockett, supra note 90, at 158–59 (noting the focus on efficiency analyses instead of on
distributive ones).
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domain is surprising given their presence in several other legal fields.100
Further, the distributive analysis suggested here does not face some of the
analytical roadblocks that hinder distributive analyses in other domains. For
reasons elaborated in Parts II and III, the development of a distributive analysis
of donative intent need not be in tension with traditional efficiency analyses,101
even though efficiency and equality are often painted as being in tension.102
A crystallized distributive analysis would perhaps also help efforts at wills
reform, which have unfortunately not been successful in a majority of
jurisdictions. Consider the primary doctrinal debate in will construction. As
noted earlier, many courts follow the plain meaning of the words in the will,
even if the results would likely frustrate donative intent.103 Scholars have urged
states to adopt a reformation rule instead, which would give the courts power to
correct errors if there were clear and convincing evidence of the testator’s
donative intent.104 Only a minority of states and courts have signed on.105 The
reform results are even worse in the realm of will execution, where scholars
have urged states to adopt a harmless error rule. This rule would permit the

100. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
24–31 (1970) (introducing distributive justice concerns into the analysis of tort law);
Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 474 (1980)
(defending the pursuit of distributional goals in contract law).
101. See infra Part II.A (discussing how the nature of donative intent satisfaction, viewed as a
good, contributes to this conclusion); Part III.B (discussing how the analysis here supports
similar reforms to those proposed by efficiency-based analyses because the targeted
population is the same).
102. See generally ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF (1975)
(painting equality and efficiency as oppositional); Guido Calabresi, About Law and
Economics: A Letter to Ronald Dworkin, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 553, 557–59 (1980) (discussing
the potential tradeoffs between efficiency and distributive concerns). This Article
embraces value pluralism and does not suggest that there should be a singular focus on
equality in the design of inheritance system. See Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S.
Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and
Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2143 (1990) (“Value pluralism is the view that
public values—those values at stake in political choice—ought to be understood to be
diverse in a particular and profound way: these choices typically implicate very different
kinds of values or even very different conceptions of values.”).
103. See Mahoney v. Grainger, 186 N.E. 86, 87 (Mass. 1933) (declining to attribute the testator’s
obvious meaning to “heir” in a will and to consider the testimony of the drafting attorney
as extrinsic evidence); supra text accompanying notes 62–68.
104. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-805 (Unif. Law Comm’n 2010) (“The court may reform the
terms of a governing instrument, even if unambiguous, to conform the terms to the
transferor’s intention if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence . . . .”); Langbein &
Waggoner, supra note 43, at 577–80 (arguing for reformation).
105. See SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 11, at 341 (“Although still a minority position,
reformation of a will to correct a mistake that is proved by clear and convincing evidence is
no longer uncommon.”).
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probate of wills with technical defects if there were clear and convincing
evidence that the testator intended the document to be her will.106 Only eleven
states have adopted harmless error, and many have limited its application to
only certain types of errors.107
In sum, a distributive analysis would enhance and deepen the existing
scholarship on donative intent, center the scholarship on middle-class
individuals who interact with the probate system, and crystallize distributive
arguments for reformers in their efforts to achieve legal change. The next Part
lays out the structure of such a distributive analysis, drawing on principles
derived from theories of distributive justice.
II.

THE DISTRIBUTIVE ANALYSIS

In a perfect world, the probate system would eliminate donative errors at
zero cost. But we do not live in a perfect world. First, there are donative
errors that result from human error, and some of these are unavoidable so long
as the legal system requires humans for its operation.108 Second, there are
donative errors produced by the legal regime as it interacts with the social
world. It is these more structural sources of donative error that are the focus of
this Article and give rise to the distributional question: Who should bear the
costs of this imperfect legal system?109 This focus on distribution is not meant
to downplay the importance of efficiency (reducing the overall number of
donative errors) or decision costs (reducing the resources required to run the
probate system),110 but merely to develop the missing distributive element in
the legal scholarship on donative intent. The aim is not to present or defend a
comprehensive view of distributive justice, nor are all possible distributive
principles considered. Rather, the goal is to draw upon certain legally relevant

106. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-523 (2015).
107. See SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 11, at 176, 176 n.56.
108. See Derk Bodde, Age, Youth, and Infirmity in the Law of Ch’ing China, 121 U. PA. L. REV.
437, 463 (1973) (“Some degree of whim and error is inevitable in every legal system.”).
109. See Aya Gruber, When Theory Met Practice: Distributional Analysis in Critical Criminal
Law Theorizing, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3211, 3213 (2015) (“[Distributional analysis] involves
meticulous and deliberate contemplation of the many interests affected by the existing . . .
law regime and evidence-informed predictions about how law reform might redistribute
harms and benefits, not just imminently but over time.”).
110. This Article assumes a constant amount of resources devoted to the probate system. While
it is worth asking how costly different probate regimes might be and how probate funding
should be prioritized against other societal goals, these questions are beyond the scope of
this Article. In addition, further research in a distributive vein might explore how the
underfunding of the probate system contributes to donative errors and how these errors
might systematically fall on certain sectors of the population.
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distributive principles to create the analytical framework that will be applied in
Part III.
Each Subpart in this Part responds to a different crucial question for
the distributive analysis. Subpart II.A responds to the question: What is
being distributed? Framed in terms of a benefit, the answer is the
satisfaction of donative intent; framed in terms of a burden, it is donative
error. Subpart II.B replies to the question: Among whom is the good being
distributed? The response is the population of individuals whose property
passes through the probate system after death, termed the donor population.
Subpart II.C answers the question: What are the rules of distribution? Equality
is the normative baseline, and the principles of desert and priority clarify which
departures from equality are particularly normatively objectionable.
A.

The Good

The first question for any distributive analysis is what good is being
distributed, and all goods can typically be conceptualized as either benefits or
burdens.111 Framed in terms of a benefit, the good at issue here is the
satisfaction of donative intent with respect to property owned at death. Framed
instead in terms of a burden, what is distributed is donative error. The
satisfaction of donative intent is not in and of itself a scarce good. In contrast to
a good like land, which is limited by the surface area of the Earth, there is no
limited pool of donative intent satisfaction. Thus, there is no zero-sum game
between claimants on the resource.112 Since the legal system simultaneously
creates and distributes the good, it is not the case that satisfying one person’s
donative intent necessarily means that another person’s donative intent cannot
be satisfied.
Because of the unique features of this good, there will be less tension
between the distributive analysis presented here and an efficiency analysis
focused on maximizing donative intent or reducing donative errors. Indeed,
the two analyses would complement each other. Efforts to reduce donative
111. See Daphne Barak-Erez, Distributive Justice in National Security Law, 3 HARV. NAT’L
SECURITY J. 283, 291 (2012) (noting that “benefits and burdens are almost inherently
interconnected” in considering distributive justice matters); Hockett, supra note 90, at 165
(“Legal rules and rulings, statutory enactments, government programs and policies all tend
to yield ‘winners’ and ‘losers’—recipients of benefits and burdens at the receiving end,
recipients by whom we wish to do right.”).
112. This may explain in part why judges do not see the distributive issue in current probate
doctrines. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court: 1983 Term—Foreword: The
Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 12 (1984) (“Judges who see economic
transactions as zero-sum games are likely to favor ‘fair’ divisions of the gains and losses.”).

Distributive Justice and Donative Intent

347

errors to zero may very well also reduce inequalities in the distribution of
donative errors if the primary subpopulation subject to donative errors is the
less well-off in the relevant population, as described below. This would mean
that satisfying the donative intent of this group serves both to reduce the overall
number of donative errors and to reduce the unjustified inequalities in the
distribution of errors. Therefore, efficiency and equality analyses would
reinforce rather than undermine each other.
While the satisfaction of donative intent, or the avoidance of donative
error, is the primary object of analysis in this Article, some mention must be
made of the broader distribution of well-being in society as well. There are two
reasons for this. First, the distributions of donative error and well-being in
society are conceptually linked: The availability of social or economic resources
impacts the capacity of individuals to engage successfully with the probate
system, just as the structure of the legal system affects one’s ability to acquire
said resources.113 Second, the distributive principle of priority requires an
understanding of who is better off and worse off by some measure in the
population. Accordingly, locating individuals or groups in the distribution of
well-being is necessary to understanding the normative attractiveness of a given
distribution of donative errors.114
Mentioning this broader distribution of well-being raises the question of
how to define well-being. This is a question, however, that this Article does not
seek to answer. Theorists of distributive justice have debated at length what the
proper “currency” of distributive justice should be, offering up such possibilities
as primary goods, economic resources, utilities, or capabilities.115 For the
purposes of this analysis, it is sufficient to note the uncontroversial fact that
there are currently inequalities in the well-being distribution, whichever metric
is employed.116 The simple presence of this inequality—that some are better off
and some are worse off—facilitates the later prioritarian analysis. In addition,
because there is significant overlap between measures of well-being, there will

113. See Palma Joy Strand, Inheriting Inequality: Wealth, Race, and the Laws of Succession, 89
OR. L. REV. 453, 491–93 (2010) (discussing the destructive effects of intestacy law on lowerincome individuals).
114. See infra Part II.C.3.
115. See Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS: AN
ANTHOLOGY 270, 283 (Daniel M. Hausman ed., 3d ed. 2008) (discussing the different
currencies of well-being).
116. See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 336–76 (Arthur
Goldhammer trans., Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 2014) (tracing the inequality in
wealth over time).
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likely also be overlap in the sets of reforms supported by those who advocate
different currencies of distributive justice.117
B.

The Population

The second task for any distributive analysis is to determine the
population that is subject to the distribution.118 The population at issue in this
Article is the donor population, defined as any person whose property interacts
with the probate system after death.119 Thus, there are two conditions for being
a member of the donor population. First, one must have property to transmit.
This could include valuable property such as real estate or financial assets, but it
could also include property that is emotionally laden but not otherwise monetarily
valuable, such as family heirlooms or photographs. Second, at least some of
that property must be transmitted through the probate system. This includes any
property that is transferred in probate court through a will or through the
application of the relevant intestacy statute.
The donor population is neither uniform nor coextensive with the
population at large. It is diverse in that it includes those wealthy enough to
employ attorneys as well as those who do not have significant assets. It diverges
from the general population because some do not meet the first condition of
inclusion and simply do not have property to transmit.120 Consequently, the
donor population does not encompass those who are worst off in society as a
whole, and the worst off in the donor population will still fall somewhere in the

117. See Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Personal Delegations, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 1231, 1257–59
(2013) (demonstrating how different conceptions of welfare can converge in support of
certain legal reforms).
118. See GRZEGORZ LISSOWSKI, PRINCIPLES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 35 (Tomasz Bigaj trans.,
Barbara Burdich Publishers 2013) (2008) (“For a full description of the distribution
situation it is necessary to determine . . . the number of distribution participants.”);
Hockett, supra note 90, at 170 (“Where there are distributions, there are beneficiaries or
victims—those to whom desirable or undesirable things are distributed.”).
119. This definition makes the donor population dependent on the governing legal regime. In
other words, changes to the probate or nonprobate systems could alter how many and
which individuals are included in the donor population. Thus, it is worth paying attention
to how reform options might affect both who will be included in the donor population as
well as the distribution of donative errors within that population. The shrinkage or
expansion of the donor population is not necessarily problematic in and of itself, provided
that individuals’ donative intent is being satisfied in some inheritance system and the
distribution of donative errors falls within an acceptable range.
120. Many, though, will have at least some personal effects that could be passed on. See ERVING
GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PATIENTS AND OTHER
INMATES 227–54 (1961) (describing the importance of even meager amounts of property to
patients in a mental health hospital).
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middle class. In addition, there are those whose property does not engage
significantly with the probate system, as it passes through the private
nonprobate system or is divided using more informal mechanisms of
transfer.121
C.

The Distributive Principles

The final question for a distributive analysis is what the rules of
distribution should be, and thus, what the ideal distribution looks like.122 The
short answer is that the distribution should contain no unjustified inequalities.
This Article adopts equality as the normative baseline not only because of its
importance in the legal system but also because of its normative weight in
Western thought.123 Therefore, donative errors should ideally fall equally on
the donor population, or everyone’s donative intent should be equally
satisfied. But not all inequalities are created equal. Inequalities are particularly
normatively undesirable if they violate both the principles of desert and
priority. The desert principle requires that the burdens of donative error not be
deserved, in that they do not result from an individual’s relevant voluntary
actions. The priority principle dictates that the burdens of donative error
should not fall on those who are already experiencing other forms of social or
economic disadvantage, or those who are less well-off in the donor population.
These three distributive principles of equality, desert, and priority are not
the only ones that could have been chosen, and this Article is not intended as an
exhaustive evaluation of how all distributive rules could be applied to the
distribution of donative errors. There are two reasons, however, why these
three distribution rules are especially well-suited to this project. First, each of
them is particularly salient in Western thought generally and legal discourse
specifically, as described in the relevant sections below. This makes it easier to
bridge the philosophical discussion of distributive justice and the legal dialogue
over donative intent and wills doctrines. Second, while these principles are not
necessarily incompatible, they do not always exist in harmony. As a result, this
121. See OR. REV. STAT. § 114.515 (2015) (describing the small estates affidavit process, in which
a personal representative can allocate the estate without needing to go through probate,
unless there is a dispute); supra note 50 (discussing the nonprobate system).
122. See Peter Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation to Distributive Justice, 77
IOWA L. REV. 515, 535 (1992) (“In distributive justice, things are allocated to persons in
accordance with a criterion of distribution. The criterion will be chosen in the light of, and
will be applied to promote, the purpose that a given distribution is intended to realize.”).
123. See Richard M. Re, Equal Right to the Poor, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1149 (2017) (tracing the
importance of the legal equality norm through the judicial oath to do equal right to the
poor and to the rich); infra notes 125–129 and accompanying text.
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analysis is an exercise in establishing a sort of “overlapping consensus,”124 as a
way to make the project appealing to multiple ideological camps. When the
results of the distributive analyses converge, there will be strong support from
various sectors for reform. In contrast, when an inequality only violates the
principle of priority, but not desert, then it has a mixed status. It will only
receive qualified support from the distributive analysis presented here as well as
a lower ranking in the order of inequalities to address in legal reforms.
Consequently, the use of these three principles may also provide a way to
prioritize targets for legal reform.
1.

Equality

Equality is a principle that holds high status in Western thought and
law.125 Numerous thinkers have conceptualized, applied, and critiqued it, and
the expansive and diverse literature on egalitarianism evidences its centrality.126
Equality exerts something of a gravitational pull on all theories of distributive
justice, which either require it explicitly or have some egalitarian assumption at
their core.127 Further, there is emerging empirical evidence that an aversion to
inequality emerges in childhood across cultures, demonstrating its near
universal appeal.128 Thus, equality has assumed the role of the starting point or
124. See John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1987)
(defining overlapping consensus as a consensus “affirmed by the opposing religious,
philosophical and moral doctrines likely to thrive over generations”).
125. See STUART WHITE, EQUALITY 1 (2007) (“The demand for equality is central to modern
politics. It has inspired many of the major political struggles of the past two
centuries . . . .”). Equality may have either intrinsic or instrumental value. See JOSEPH RAZ,
THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 177 (1986) (making this distinction between intrinsic and
instrumental value); see also Thomas Nagel, Equality, in THE IDEAL OF EQUALITY 60, 62
(Matthew Clayton & Andrew Williams eds., 2000) (noting that there are individualistic
and communitarian arguments for equality as an intrinsic good).
126. The literature is immense. Some helpful starting points include EQUALITY (David
Johnston ed., 2000), and EQUALITY: SELECTED READINGS (Louis P. Pojman & Robert
Westmoreland eds., 1997).
127. See AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 3 (1992F) (“[T]he major ethical theories of
social arrangement all share an endorsement of equality in terms of some focal variable,
even though the variables that are selected are frequently very different between one theory
and another.”). Sen gives the example of libertarianism, which focuses on “extensive
liberties to be equally guaranteed to each.” Id. Another example is utilitarianism, a
distributive theory often portrayed as being at odds with egalitarian theories, whose
egalitarian cornerstone, attributed to Jeremy Bentham, is “everybody to count for one,
nobody for more than one.” See JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 93 (7th ed. 1879)
(1861).
128. See, e.g., P.R. Blake et al., The Ontogeny of Fairness in Seven Societies, 528 NATURE 258,
259–60 (2015) (finding that advantageous inequity aversion arises in early childhood while
disadvantageous inequity aversion arises in later childhood, with some variation by
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baseline for analysis, with any departure from it needing explanation or
justification.129
For the analysis here, there are three main senses in which the concept of
equality is important. First, there is moral equality, or the notion that each
person has equal moral worth and deserves equal respect.130 This principle, if
not the practice, has been ensconced in American law since the founding of the
Republic, enshrined as it is in the Declaration of Independence.131 It garners
practically universal adherence in Western thought, as it derives from the
Enlightenment belief that humans are moral equals rather than worthy based
on their status in a social hierarchy.132
Second, there is formal legal equality, or the notion that individuals should
be treated equally before the law. At a basic level, this means that there must be
universal laws that apply to all with no one being “above the law.”133 In terms of
the judicial system, it requires that like cases be treated alike and that unalike
cases be treated unalike.134 This formal legal equality is a well-established part

129.

130.
131.
132.

133.
134.

society). A sense of fairness based on equal treatment may exist in other species as well.
See Sarah F. Brosnan & Frans B.M. de Waal, Monkeys Reject Unequal Pay, 425 NATURE
297, 298–99 (2003) (finding that capuchin monkeys rejected unequal rewards for the same
task).
See, e.g., Richard Wollheim & Isaiah Berlin, Equality, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 281,
305 (1956) (“The assumption is that equality needs no reasons, only inequality does so; . . .
differences, unsystematic behaviour, change in conduct, need explanation and, as a rule,
justification.”); see also PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
RHETORICAL FORCE OF ‘EQUALITY’ IN MORAL AND LEGAL DISCOURSE 232–33 (1990)
(defining the logical structure of the presumption of equality).
See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, ONE ANOTHER’S EQUALS: THE BASIS OF HUMAN EQUALITY 1–2
(2017) (terming this form of equality “basic equality”); see also, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 227 (1977).
See The DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created equal . . . .”).
See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 71 (J.W. Gough ed., 1948)
(1690) (noting that governments “govern by promulgated established laws, not to be
varied in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favourite at court
and the countryman at plough”); Michel Rosenfeld, Substantive Equality and Equal
Opportunity: A Jurisprudential Appraisal, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1687, 1700–01 (1986) (“[S]ince
the eighteenth century Western society has valued the proposition that individuals are
morally equal.” (citing AMY GUTMANN, LIBERAL EQUALITY 18 (1980)).
See WHITE, supra note 125, at 4–5 (defining legal equality as the combination of universal
laws where no one is above the law, impartial application of laws, and equal protection of
citizens).
See Kenneth I. Winston, On Treating Like Cases Alike, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 5 (1974) (“Thus,
a law is justly applied when applied to all those and only those who are alike in satisfying
the criteria specified in the law. . . . [It is] without prejudice, interest, or caprice.”). This
maxim has an ancient pedigree, deriving from Aristotle. See ARISTOTLE, THE
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 112 (David Ross trans., J.L. Ackrill & J.O. Urmson eds., Oxford
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of our constitutional regime and finds explicit statutory expression in
antidiscrimination law as well.135 This is not to say that formal legal equality has
been achieved, either historically or in the present day, but it remains a central
aspiration.136
Third, there is substantive equality, or the principle that benefits and
burdens should be distributed among the relevant population members in an
equal fashion.137 Substantive equality has both a social and an economic
dimension. There is social equality when there is a widespread belief that no
one is superior to any other person on the basis of class, gender, race, or other
social characteristics.138 There is economic equality when resources are equally
distributed among society members so that these members have equal
opportunities.139 At a fundamental level, substantive equality represents
equality in fact or equality on the ground, whereas moral and legal equality are
more abstract in nature.
These three senses of equality are related and complementary. Moral
equality provides the theoretical basis for why we should treat individuals equally
before the law or why society’s resources should be distributed more or less
equally among its members.140 Legal equality ensures that the aspirations of
moral equality are enforced through respect for rights recognized by the law,

135.

136.

137.
138.
139.
140.

Univ. Press 1991) (1568) (“[T]his is the origin of quarrels and complaints—when either
equals have and are awarded unequal shares, or unequals equal shares.”).
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (2012)
(codifying Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination in
employment on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, and religion); Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620, 629–36 (1996) (applying equal protection principles in the context of sexual
orientation); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (noting that Title VII
requires the removal of discriminatory barriers to employment).
See Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245, 252 (1983) (“America’s
devotion to ideals of equality has always been ambivalent. Thomas Jefferson, who drafted
the Declaration of Independence, may have been troubled about owning slaves, but he was
not wholly convinced that black people were the equals of whites.” (citing WINTHROP D.
JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK 430–40 (1968)).
See IWAO HIROSE, EGALITARIANISM 1 (2015) (“Egalitarianism: a class of distributive
principles, which claim that individuals should have equal quantities of well-being or
morally relevant factors that affect their life.”).
See Samuel Scheffler, The Practice of Equality, in SOCIAL EQUALITY: ON WHAT IT MEANS TO
BE EQUALS 21, 21–22 (Carina Fourie et al. eds., 2015) (understanding this as a relational
view of equality, as opposed to a distributive view of equality).
See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 356–58 (2011).
See RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 1 (2000) (“Equal concern is the sovereign virtue
of political community—without it government is only tyranny—and when a nation’s
wealth is very unequally distributed, as the wealth of even very prosperous nations now is,
then its equal concern is suspect.”).
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and it is often a mechanism through which substantive equality can be
achieved.141 Substantive equality also reflects the aspirations of moral
equality, and it creates the conditions for truly equal legal outcomes, which
may not always be guaranteed by formal legal equality alone.142 This is because
treating individuals who are alike on one legally salient dimension may not
always be appropriate if the material conditions of those two individuals are
different.143 Those with more material goods, improved social position, or
simply more power are better able to take advantage of the legal system to
achieve desired outcomes.144
Just as equality is an aspiration of the broader legal system, it is also an
aspiration of the probate system. Moral equality manifests as an equal respect
for an individual’s donative intent, regardless of the content of that donative
intent or the amount of property one owns at death.145 In other words, fulfilling
141. See, e.g., TSACHI KEREN-PAZ, TORTS, EGALITARIANISM AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 17–19
(2007) (arguing for introducing an egalitarian sensitivity into tort law); Ronald M.
Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191, 217–18 (1980) (noting the possibility
for common law decisions to be redistributive); Janet Halley, What Is Family Law?: A
Genealogy Part I, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 1 (2011) (describing the family as a legal
institution at the nexus of social and economic distribution).
142. See Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the
Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1144 (1986) (“Individual needs and positions
may have to be taken into account in any particular situation in order to achieve equality of
outcome.”).
143. As Max Weber has explained:
Formal justice guarantees the maximum freedom for the interested parties to
represent their formal legal interests. But because of the unequal distribution of
economic power, which the system of formal justice legalizes, this very freedom must
time and again produce consequences which are contrary to the substantive
postulates of religious ethics or of political expediency.

MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 228 (Max Rheinstein ed., Edward Shils &
Max Rheinstein trans., 1954); Nagel, supra note 125, at 60 (“It is a commonplace that real
equality of every kind is sensitive to economic factors.”). Feminists have developed this
point extensively in legal theory with respect to social equality, pointing out that legal
equality will not lead to substantive equality so long as men and women are differentially
situated in society. See Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights
Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REV. 387, 397–401 (1984) (summarizing some of the feminist
contributions to the substantive equality discourse).
144. See J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 397 (“Yet as is often the case, guarantees of formal liberty
and formal equality generally favor those groups in society that are already the most
powerful.”); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE
L.J. 1281, 1287 (1991) (“Inequality is treating someone differently if one is the same, the
same if one is different. Unquestioned is how difference is socially created or defined, who
sets the point of reference for sameness, or the comparative empirical approach itself.”).
145. See Mary Louise Fellows, In Search of Donative Intent, 73 IOWA L. REV. 611, 630 (1988)
(arguing that the legal system should enforce this through the principle of “equal planning
under the law”).
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the donative intent of a farmer passing on the family farm to her kids is just as
important as the satisfaction of a billionaire’s wishes to create trust funds for
her pets.146 Legal equality requires that individuals have equal rights to pass on
their property at death. If two individuals execute valid wills, the probate court
should treat them the same way, enforcing their demands regardless of content.
Likewise, the probate court must apply the intestacy statute the same way to all
individuals who die intestate, not changing the distribution because of the
particulars of a given case. Even if this formal legal equality were achieved,
however, it is not the case that every person’s donative intent would be satisfied
in equal fashion, creating the specter of substantive inequality. For example,
consider two individuals who execute wills with identical provisions; one
complies with will execution rules because she had access to quality counsel
while the other does not because she did not. Formal legal equality demands
that we treat these cases as unalike because one complied with the necessary will
formalities while the other did not. However, the reason why they are unalike
may be because of unequal conditions that made obtaining quality counsel
difficult for the second person. Thus, the legal outcomes diverge, as required by
formal legal equality, but this leads to a substantive inequality with respect to
donative intent, compounding an existing socioeconomic inequality. This
situation highlights the tension between these two forms of equality in the probate
system.
Equality, however, is only the starting point for the analysis. A distribution that contains inequalities may not necessarily be unjust from a
distributive perspective, though it may still be subject to critique on efficiency
grounds. The next two Sections explore those inequalities that are particularly
normatively undesirable.
2.

Desert

Like equality, desert plays an outsized role in the law.147 It is strongly
connected to the concept of responsibility, or the idea that everyone has free
will to pursue certain courses of action and may benefit or suffer from the
consequences of whatever course has been chosen.148 Many of these consequences
146. See Buckley, supra note 12.
147. Also, like equality, desert may have both intrinsic and instrumental value. See SHELLY
KAGAN, THE GEOMETRY OF DESERT 15–19 (2012) (discussing the nature of desert’s value).
For an argument against desert, see Alan Zaitchik, On Deserving to Deserve, 6 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 370 (1977).
148. See Marc Fleurbaey, Four Approaches to Equal Opportunity, in RESPONSIBILITY AND
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 77, 81–82 (Carl Knight & Zofia Stemplowska eds., 2011) (“[W]hen
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will be legal in nature. This is apparent in criminal law, where the basis for
punishments is often put in terms of desert.149 It also governs large swaths of
tort law, which has adopted legal concepts such as assumption of risk and
contributory negligence to limit recovery when plaintiffs are in some way at
fault.150 Desert even crops up in areas of law that one would not necessarily
expect, such as contracts,151 intellectual property,152 and even personal
jurisdiction.153 This ubiquity in law reflects widely held beliefs that the distribution
of benefits and burdens in society—in this case legal entitlements—should in
some way reflect the actions of the individuals who are receiving those benefits
and burdens.154
Because of the importance of desert in Western thought and law,
philosophers have incorporated it into egalitarian theories, attempting to meld
equality and desert together. This branch of egalitarian theory is called luck
egalitarianism.155 Its central idea is that inequalities in a given distribution may

149.

150.

151.
152.
153.
154.

155.

two individuals are held responsible for the differences that create unequal achievements
between them, this normally means that redistribution between them is not needed.”); see
also DAVID MILLER, SOCIAL JUSTICE 95–102 (1976) (examining whether determinism
undermines the concept of desert and concluding that it does not).
See, e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO SHOULD BE
PUNISHED HOW MUCH? 11 (2008) (describing “empirical desert” as a basis for criminal
punishment); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV.
453, 454 (1997) (arguing that utility and desert are compatible and mutually reinforcing in
criminal law).
See John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 520 (2003)
(describing the historical emergence of assumption of risk and contributory negligence);
David G. Owen, Deterrence and Desert in Tort: A Comment, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 665 (1985)
(examining the role of desert in tort law).
See Todd D. Rakoff, The Five Justices of Contract Law, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 733, 765–78
(2016) (examining the role of desert in contract law).
See Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Intellectual Property’s Negative Space: Beyond the Utilitarian,
40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 441, 454–56 (2013) (examining the role of the “labor-desert” concept
in intellectual property law).
See Kevin C. McMunigal, Desert, Utility, and Minimum Contacts: Toward a Mixed Theory
of Personal Jurisdiction, 108 YALE L.J. 189, 191–93 (1998) (applying desert theories to
personal jurisdiction).
See generally David Miller, Distributive Justice: What the People Think, 102 ETHICS 555
(1992) (summarizing empirical research on when individuals perceive desert versus
equality as being the operative distributive principle). The desert analysis presented here
regards institutionalized desert claims. See John Kleinig, The Concept of Desert, 8 AM.
PHIL. Q. 71, 71 (1971) (“Institutionalized desert claims, which have the (at least implicit)
general form: ‘X deserves A of Y in virtue of B.’ The deserved treatment in these cases
presupposes a context of legal or quasi-legal rules . . . .”).
See generally G.A. COHEN, RESCUING JUSTICE AND EQUALITY (2008); Richard J. Arneson,
Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 56 PHIL. STUD. 77 (1989); Ronald Dworkin,
What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283 (1981). This
school of thought is not without its critics. See, e.g., S.L. HURLEY, JUSTICE, LUCK, AND
KNOWLEDGE (2003) (arguing that responsibility does not offer adequate guidance in the
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be justified if those inequalities are in some sense deserved.156 To be deserved,
an outcome must derive from either voluntary action or “option luck,” rather
than “[b]rute luck.” Option luck “is a matter of how deliberate and calculated
gambles turn out—whether someone gains or loses through accepting an
isolated risk he or she should have anticipated and might have declined.”157 In
contrast, brute luck is “a matter of how risks fall out that are not in that sense
deliberate gambles.”158 For example, we would view losing all of one’s wealth
due to an unforeseen earthquake more sympathetically than losing all of one’s
wealth due to a conscious decision to play the slot machines in Las Vegas.
There is a second sense in which desert comes into play in evaluating
inequalities. This is when a particular “desert basis,” or characteristic or
prior activity of a person, makes that person deserve some sort of treatment.159
To do so, the desert basis must trigger some kind of appraising attitude.160 This
necessarily imports external values into the desert analysis, as appraising
attitudes may differ based on the social context.161 In the case of good desert,
this attitude may be admiration, approval, or gratitude.162 For example, a
person who saves a child from drowning will trigger a positive appraising
attitude from others. As a result, we may want to reward that person with
respect, esteem, or possibly even money. In contrast, bad desert involves a

156.

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

162.

distribution of goods); Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS
287 (1999) (arguing that the point of equality is to eliminate oppression rather than to
eliminate the effects of brute luck); Samuel Scheffler, Choice, Circumstance, and the Value
of Equality, 4 POL. PHIL. & ECON. 5 (2005) (arguing that adopting conservative notions of
choice and responsibility undermines the egalitarian project).
See SHLOMI SEGALL, WHY INEQUALITY MATTERS: LUCK EGALITARIANISM, ITS MEANING AND
VALUE 23–24 (2016) (defending the egalitarian view that equality is intrinsically valuable
so long as inequalities derive only from the fault of one’s own actions); Larry Temkin,
Equality, Priority, and the Levelling Down Objection, in THE IDEAL OF EQUALITY, supra note
125, at 129 (“Non-instrumental egalitarians care about equality. More specifically, on my
view, they care about undeserved, nonvoluntary, inequalities, which they regard as bad, or
objectionable, because unfair.”).
Dworkin, supra note 155, at 293.
Id.
See JOEL FEINBERG, DOING & DESERVING 58 (1970) (“If a person is deserving of some sort of
treatment, he must, necessarily, be so in virtue of some possessed characteristic or prior
activity.”).
In other words, it is about “fitting desired forms of treatment to qualities and actions.”
MILLER, supra note 148, at 86.
See Julian Lamont, The Concept of Desert in Distributive Justice, 44 PHIL. Q. 45, 49 (1994)
(“When people make desert-claims they are not simply telling us what desert itself
requires. They unwittingly introduce external values, and make their desert-judgements in
the light of those values.”).
See MILLER, supra note 148, at 85 (“[G]ood desert (i.e. deserving benefit as opposed to
punishment) is a matter of fitting desired forms of treatment to qualities and actions which
are generally held in high regard.”).
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performance or activity that triggers a negative appraising attitude, such as
disapproval or disgust. If, instead of saving the child, a person laughed at the
child’s misfortune, this would trigger such a negative appraising attitude. That
person may be subject to negative social sanctions, such as loss of respect and
esteem. Further, if this happens in a jurisdiction that has a duty to rescue rule,
there may be legal consequences as well.163
With respect to the distribution of benefits and burdens, then, one must
ensure that a given distribution actually tracks the desert basis, and not some
irrelevant factor or one outside of the individual’s control.164 For example, the
movement to abolish pay inequity based on sex has moral force because
compensation is tracking sex rather than performance.165 Sex is not something
that is within the control of the individual, relevant to workplace
compensation, or a voluntary performance that triggers a relevant appraising
attitude. In other words, it is an invalid desert basis. If the distribution of
benefits and burdens is tracking such an invalid desert basis, whatever
inequality that results cannot be justified by the principle of desert.
Therefore, desert helps us identify inequalities that are particularly worthy
of critique because they are unrelated to an individual’s voluntary choices. But
a second condition must be met before the inequalities can become a certain
target of reform. The next Subpart isolates those inequalities that are
unjustified because they work to the detriment of those who are less well-off.
3.

Priority

Once we have a picture of what inequalities might be deserved or
undeserved, we can further scrutinize any inequalities in the legal system using
the principle of priority. Priority is the principle that benefitting people matters
more the worse off they are.166 In other words, it is better to provide a benefit to

163. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (2002) (requiring assistance to those who are exposed
to grave physical harm).
164. See DAVID MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 142 (1999) (“One kind of criticism is that
the institutional allocation is tracking not performance at all, but some irrelevant
characteristic like sex or geographical location . . . .”); G.A. Cohen, On the Currency of
Egalitarian Justice, 99 ETHICS 906, 908 (1989) (“I believe that the primary egalitarian
impulse is to extinguish the influence on distribution of both exploitation and brute
luck.”).
165. See Nicole Buonocore Porter & Jessica R. Vartanian, Debunking the Market Myth in Pay
Discrimination Cases, 12 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 159, 187–88 (2011) (discussing how
preconceived notions can inappropriately influence the estimated worth of female
employees).
166. Derek Parfit provides the following explanations:
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someone who is worse off rather than to someone who is better off.
Conversely, it is worse to impose a burden on someone who is worse off rather
than on someone who is better off.167 Thus, we must have some sense of where
individuals fall in the distribution of overall well-being to effectively perform a
prioritarian analysis of the distribution of donative errors.168
The priority principle finds ample support in Western thought. For
example, Christian religious doctrine openly and often calls for believers to
support the needy over those who are better off.169 In the secular philosophical
realm, the most famous articulation of a priority principle comes from John
Rawls’s theory of justice. His Difference Principle would only permit
inequalities in the basic structure of society that serve the least well off.170
The principle also finds expression in legal doctrine and the structure of
the legal system. A prime example is the inequality of bargaining power
doctrine in contract law.171 This is a contextual factor that courts may assess to

For Utilitarians, the moral importance of each benefit depends only on how
great this benefit would be. For Prioritarians, it also depends on how well off
the person is to whom this benefit comes. We should not give equal weight
to equal benefits, whoever receives them. Benefits to the worse off should be
given more weight.
Derek Parfit, Equality and Priority, 10 RATIO 202, 213 (1997). For an argument against this
view, see Michael Otsuka & Alex Voorhoeve, Why It Matters That Some Are Worse Off
Than Others: An Argument Against the Priority View, 37 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 171 (2009),
which argues against the priority view based on its treatment of intrapersonal and
interpersonal tradeoffs.
167. From a pure efficiency perspective, one would be agnostic as between these two options, as
the focus is on providing the greatest amount of benefit, or the least amount of harm, to the
population at large. The principle of priority, however, emphasizes that this still can be an
important choice in deciding how to distribute benefits and burdens.
168. Cf. text accompanying notes 114, 117 .
169. The book of Matthew states:
Then they in turn will ask: “Lord, when did we see you hungry or thirsty or away from
home or naked, or ill or in prison and not attend you in your needs?” He will answer
them: “I assure you, as often as you neglected to do it to one of these least ones, you
neglected to do it to me.”

Matthew 25:44–45; see also RONALD J. SIDER, RICH CHRISTIANS IN AN AGE OF HUNGER 62–68
(1977) (collecting other Biblical verses about mistreatment of poor populations); Adam S.
Chodorow, Biblical Tax Systems and the Case for Progressive Taxation, 23 J.L. & RELIGION
51 (2007) (arguing from a biblical perspective that progressive taxation is consistent with
principles found in the Bible).
170. See JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 42–43 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001)
(“Social and economic inequalities are . . . to be to the greatest benefit of the leastadvantaged members of society (the difference principle).”). For a further exposition and
defense of this principle, see Joshua Cohen, Democratic Equality, 99 ETHICS 727 (1989).
171. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 692 (Cal. 2000)
(finding inequality of power between employer and employee as relevant to determining
the legality of an arbitration provision); Wille v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 549 P.2d 903, 907 (Kan.
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level the playing field for the less powerful party in a bilateral transaction.172 A
systemic example would be the congressional funding of legal aid services,
which sustains organizations that provide assistance to low-income people in
asserting their legal rights.173 Again, the emphasis is on assisting those who are
in the lower tiers of the distribution of well-being, and this assistance will help
individuals achieve equality in fact with respect to their legal rights.
Priority is consonant with equality in that benefitting people who are less
well off in the population will often produce more egalitarian results.174 At the
same time, it is distinct from equality because it is concerned with improving
the absolute well-being of individuals, rather than improving well-being
relative to other individuals in the population.175 Consequently, in the
allocation of benefits and burdens, we should be particularly incensed when
burdens fall on those who are already worse off, and we should be pleased
when benefits flow to them.
As a conceptual matter, this principle is important because it explicitly
links the distribution of donative errors to the distribution of overall well-being.

172.

173.

174.

175.

1976) (describing inequality of bargaining power as one of the factors that contributes to
finding a contract unconscionable).
See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139, 150
(2005) (“[T]he legal doctrine represents an attempt by the legal system to assign legal
consequences to perceived gross disparities of bargaining power in a transaction and to
assess the degree of those disparities post hoc through the judicial process.”). A key feature
of this doctrine is its embrace of a contextual inquiry, similar to many proposed reforms of
inheritance law.
See William P. Quigley, The Demise of Law Reform and the Triumph of Legal Aid: Congress
and the Legal Services Corporation From the 1960’s to the 1990’s, 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 241, 245–64 (1998) (tracing the history of congressional funding). But see Alan W.
Houseman, Restrictions by Funders and the Ethical Practice of Law, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
2187, 2191–98 (1999) (detailing the funding restrictions put in place by Congress in the
1990s).
See Derek Parfit, Equality or Priority, in THE IDEAL OF EQUALITY, supra note 125, at 106
(“But, since [the priority] view has a built-in bias towards equality, it could be Egalitarian
in a second, looser sense. We might say that, if we take this view, we are Non-Relational
Egalitarians.”); see also HIROSE, supra note 137, at 93–94 (noting the convergence between
prioritarianism and egalitarianism in that prioritarianism satisfies the Pigou-Dalton
condition).
See Dennis McKerlie, Equality and Priority, in 6 UTILITAS 25, 26 (1994) (“The priority view
does not see any value in equality understood as a relationship between people. Like
utilitarianism, it aims exclusively at improving the content of people’s lives.”); see also Joel
Feinberg, Noncomparative Justice, 83 PHIL. REV. 297, 310–11 (1974) (distinguishing
between comparative and noncomparative theories of justice). Because of its
noncomparative nature, the priority principle also avoids one of the most powerful
arguments against egalitarian theories: the levelling down objection. See generally Nils
Holtug, Egalitarianism and the Levelling Down Objection, 58 ANALYSIS 166 (1998)
(discussing the objection and responses).
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A donative error is a burden that society should seek to avoid in general, just as
one should avoid other harms to the population. From the perspective of the
priority principle, however, society should especially seek to avoid imposing
that burden on those in society who are already lack resources, opportunities,
or other aspects of advantage.176 Thus, if inequalities in a given distribution
work solely to the detriment of those who are better off, they may be justifiable
in a prioritarian analysis. On the other hand, if they harm those who are worse
off in the relevant population, they are particularly undesirable from a
prioritarian perspective.
In terms of the distributive analysis, equality forms the baseline, while
desert and priority help to identify those inequalities that are particularly
unjustified and worthy of critique. These are inequalities either that are not
deserved or that disadvantage members of the population who are less well-off,
or both. Inequalities that only satisfy one of these two conditions, desert and
priority, will receive only qualified support from this analysis. Those
inequalities that satisfy both should be the primary targets for reform, a topic
that is taken up in the next Part.
III.

APPLICATION

The theoretical principles of distributive justice are relevant and useful to
the field of inheritance law because they help to identify arguments and avenues
for reform. This Part applies the analytical framework developed in Part II to
the probate system and sources of donative error explained in Part I. Subpart
III.A examines the sources of inequality in the distribution of donative errors
and applies the distributive principles of desert and priority to them. Subpart
III.B discusses reforms of the legal system that are supported by the distributive
analysis. These reforms revolve around simplifying will execution and enabling
judicial discretion to facilitate donative intent in the wills domain.
A.

The Deserving and Disadvantaged Decedent

We now shift focus from abstract distributive principles to the particular
individual who might experience donative errors: the deserving and
disadvantaged decedent. This stylized individual is deserving of having her

176. That being said, the claim is not that a donative error is on par with these other forms of
disadvantage, or even that reducing donative errors should be the first priority.
Instead, the priority analysis with respect to donative intent simply requires that this
particular harm of donative error not fall on those who are worse off, by whatever metric.
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donative intent satisfied because she engages in certain voluntary actions
relevant to inheritance law that trigger a positive appraising attitude.177 She is
disadvantaged in the context of the donor population because she lacks the
privileges that other donors might have, be they economic assets, social
resources, or capabilities. In other words, she is likely to be among the middle
class: worse off than others in the donor population, but not so disadvantaged
that she has no property to transmit.178 The rest of this Subpart fleshes out how
the principles of desert and priority both affect individuals encountering the
probate system and create inequalities in the distribution of donative errors.
A helpful place to begin the analysis is to examine how the current system
implements the desert principle. The implicit desert basis of traditional wills
doctrines is perfect will execution with all the necessary formalities as well as
perfect drafting so that there are no mistakes in the will itself.179 In this context,
the reward for one’s performance of perfect will execution and drafting is the
actualization of donative intent, or the avoidance of donative error. Thus,
under traditional doctrine, if a decedent fails to plan or draft perfectly, she then
theoretically deserves the donative errors that may result from the mismatch
between the intestacy codes and her donative intent.
This desert basis, however, sets the bar too high. A superior desert basis
would be the good faith attempt to engage in will drafting and execution,
regardless of whether one does so perfectly.180 This less demanding desert basis
is a cut above for three reasons. First, it is the core of what we might find
admirable, which is the effort to engage in estate planning in the first place. It
demonstrates that one possesses the wherewithal and motivation to overcome
fear, laziness, procrastination, and a social context that discourages

177. See supra Part II.C.2.
178. See supra Part II.B, Part II.C.3.
179. As one court explained:
It is presumed citizens know the law, including the intestacy laws, and it is up to any
person who does not want those laws applied to his or her estate to opt out by
preparing a will setting forth other dispositions. Decedent did not so provide and
therefore is presumed to endorse application of the default intestacy laws.

In re Estate of Dye, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 362, 368 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). This is relaxed
somewhat for updating one’s estate plan. See infra text accompanying notes 185 –188.
180. Desert theorists have favored focusing on the effort of individuals rather than the end
achievement. See Heather Milne, Desert, Effort and Equality, 3 J. APPLIED PHIL. 235, 240
(1986) (“The well-being desert theorist must make use of a principle of purposeful effort so
as to rule out the possibility of rewarding costs incurred through any type of effort. . . .
[T]he effort that forms the basis of a desert claim must be directed towards some end that
we view favourably.”).

362

65 UCLA L. R EV. 324 (2018)

engagement with topics related to death.181 It is also a relatively unique
performance, as a majority of Americans do not currently have a will.182 From
the perspective of those left behind, advance planning on property or other
matters is typically quite helpful, and studies have found time and again that it
is met with gratitude by survivors.183 This is because those left behind do not
have to sort through difficult issues of health care decisions or property
allocation at a sensitive time. Finally, from the perspective of the legal system, it
assists with divining a decedent’s donative intent, as the best way to know a
person’s intent is if she proclaimed it.
Second, the willingness to engage in will execution is something that
courts have recognized as admirable as a doctrinal matter. When a testator
does execute a will, she benefits from the presumption against intestacy, or the
principle that the court should construe the will to avoid distributing any
property in the estate by the default rules of intestacy.184 Courts are also much
more lenient if one makes estate planning mistakes after a will is executed.185
An example of the above is the doctrine of dependent relative revocation.
Under this doctrine, if you revoke a will based on a mistake of law or fact, the
court will revoke the revocation to put a previously existing will back into
effect.186 The willingness of many courts to correct mistakes in will
181. See Allan Kellehear, Are We a ‘Death-Denying’ Society? A Sociological Review, 18 SOC. SCI.
& MED. 713, 715 (1984) (advancing the thesis that our society is in denial of death). But see
Philip A. Mellor, Death in High Modernity: The Contemporary Presence and Absence of
Death, 40 SOC. REV. 11, 11 (1993) (arguing that although there is increasing academic
discussion of death, the topic remains sequestered away from the public square).
182. See Jeff Reeves, Plan Ahead: 64% of Americans Don’t Have a Will, USA TODAY (Apr. 26,
2016, 12:51 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2015/07/11/
estate-plan-will/71270548 [https://perma.cc/KU9Y-ME9Z] (reporting on results of a
recent survey).
183. See Cahn & Ziettlow, supra note 27, at 331 (noting how family members expressed
appreciation for the guidance and emotional understanding that estate planning provides).
184. For example, one court noted:
A testator, by the act of the making of a will, casts grave doubt on any assumption that
he expressly intends to chance dying intestate as to any portion of his property. . . .
[T]he courts favor a construction which avoids partial intestacy and adopt one which
results in a complete disposition of the estate.

In re Fabbri’s Will, 140 N.E.2d 269, 273 (N.Y. 1957) (first citing Haug v. Schumacher, 60
N.E. 245, 246 (1901); then citing Lewis v. Howe, 66 N.E. 975, 977, 1101 (1903)). Another
court put it succinctly: “[T]he testator is presumed to intend to avoid intestacy otherwise
he or she would not have bothered to make a will.” In re Estate of Herceg, 747 N.Y.S.2d
901, 903 (Sur. Ct. 2002).
185. See Baron, supra note 82, at 70–75 (discussing the differential treatment of the testator in
these two situations).
186. See, e.g., In re Estate of Alburn, 118 N.W.2d 919, 923 (Wis. 1963) (applying the doctrine of
dependent relative revocation to revive an older will that was closer to the decedent’s
donative intent than intestacy); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER
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revocation, when courts are typically less willing to do so for will execution,
demonstrates that courts recognize some valuable performance in
engaging in the estate planning process itself, rather than in doing so perfectly.
The various doctrines that automatically update one’s estate plan in light
of changed circumstances bolster this conclusion. For example, if one executes
a will and then fails to update it after a divorce, the doctrine of revocation upon
divorce will revoke all dispositions in favor of the ex-spouse, on the theory that
one would not have wanted property going to an ex.187 Similarly, if one
executed a will before one had a child but did not update it to include the new
descendant, the pretermitted heir doctrine will still allow those children to
inherit to prevent unintentional disinheritance.188 All of these doctrines point
to recognizing the good faith effort at estate planning rather than the perfect
maintenance of an up-to-date will before death.
The third reason why the good faith effort at estate planning is a superior
desert basis when compared to the perfect execution of an estate plan is that the
latter desert basis may actually track irrelevant characteristics, such as
education or economic status, rather than some meaningful characteristic or
action by the decedent. In other words, the valid execution and drafting of a
will may have more to do with having a legal education or the economic
resources to hire a quality attorney than any action or characteristic intrinsic to
the person receiving the reward of having her donative intent respected.189 Of
course, failing to validly execute a well-drafted will is not necessarily indicative
of socioeconomic status. For example, many were shocked that the musical
artist Prince died without a will, despite his significant wealth and routine
contact with attorneys for other legal issues.190 But in cases where will

187.
188.

189.
190.

DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1999) (describing the circumstances under
which this doctrine can be applied).
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010) (detailing how divorce serves as
a changed circumstance that revokes bequests to a spouse by operation of law).
See ALA. CODE § 43-8-91 (1991) (“If a testator fails to provide in his will for any of his
children born or adopted after the execution of his will, the omitted child receives a share
in the estate equal in value to that which he would have received if the testator had died
intestate . . . .”).
See MILLER, supra note 164, at 142 (noting the problem when the desert basis is “tracking
not performance at all, but some irrelevant characteristic like sex or geographical
location”).
Journalist Ben Sisario explained:
In the music business, Prince . . . was known as a mercurial star who cycled
through lawyers and representatives frequently, and who often preferred to deal
personally with record companies, concert promoters and even digital music services.
But that history of self-sufficiency could have severe consequences if Prince did not
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execution was attempted and the resulting document was clearly intended to be
a will, one has demonstrated the motivation and good faith effort to engage in
estate planning that should be rewarded.
To summarize, we should attempt to protect decedents who made a good
faith attempt to engage in will execution from donative error. In other words,
an inequality in the distribution of donative errors that harms those who do not
deserve it is particularly normatively undesirable. This is the primary reason
why the legal system provides some degree of protection to individuals from
misdeeds of third parties in the estate planning process through the doctrines of
undue influence,191 fraud,192 duress,193 and tortious interference with an
expectancy.194 Even those who are the victims of negligent attorneys have the
imperfect solution of malpractice actions against the offending attorneys,
which, along with the ethics complaints, can have serious reputational effects.195
The desert analysis suggests extending this type of protection to other deserving
individuals as well.
While the principle of desert provides theoretical justification for the
protection of the deserving decedent, the principle of priority does the same for
the disadvantaged decedent. The priority principle identifies those systematic
inequalities in the distribution of donative errors that would be normatively
undesirable because they compound or amplify existing disadvantages that an
individual in the donor population might experience. In the probate context,
these disadvantages revolve around socioeconomic status, as one’s social and
leave an orderly estate—a strong possibility if no will turns up, several music-industry
lawyers and executives said.

191.
192.
193.

194.
195.

Ben Sisario, Prince Died Without a Will, According to Court Documents Filed by His Sister,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/27/arts/music/ princedied-without-a-will-according-to-court-documents.html.
See Estate of Lakatosh, 656 A.2d 1378, 1382–83 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (noting that will
contestants can shift the burden to a proponent of the will to disprove undue influence).
See Rood v. Newberg, 718 N.E.2d 886, 892 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (“In order to prove fraud
by deceit, a plaintiff ordinarily must show that the defendant made a false statement of a
material fact with knowledge of its falsity in order to induce the plaintiff to act . . . .”).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3(c) (AM.
LAW INST. 2003) (“A donative transfer is procured by duress if the wrongdoer threatened to
perform or did perform a wrongful act that coerced the donor into making a donative
transfer that the donor would not otherwise have made.”).
See Schilling v. Herrera, 952 So.2d 1231, 1234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (describing the
cause of action that protects a beneficiary who has no probate remedies).
See AM. BAR ASS’N, PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS: 2008–2011, at 5 (2012) (noting
that a 2011 study found over ten percent of ethics complaints are in fact lodged in trusts
and estates matters); Martin D. Begleiter, First Let’s Sue All the Lawyers—What Will We
Get: Damages for Estate Planning Malpractice, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 325, 327 (2000) (noting
that only six states maintain the absolute privity defense that bars beneficiaries from suing
the drafting attorney).
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economic resources control one’s ability to access the specialized legal
knowledge needed to navigate the formalistic legal environment. This is not to
suggest that all those who lack economic resources are unsophisticated and lack
legal knowledge, or that all those who possess such resources are sophisticated
about legal rules. The degree to which different forms of advantage or
disadvantage overlap within segments of the population is an empirical
question, but this Article assumes that there is at least some relationship
between different sources of disadvantage relevant to the inheritance system.196
There are three ways in which the legal environment, the specialized legal
knowledge it requires, and preexisting disadvantage may be connected. First,
an individual may lack sufficient education to know about the legal utility of
wills or the specialized knowledge required to comply with formalistic
doctrines if she were to attempt willmaking on her own.197 Second, this lack of
knowledge may be duplicated in one’s social network as well. Whereas well-off
individuals may have attorneys in the family with exposure to the importance
of wills in estate planning or with the ability to draft a will at little or no cost, this
low-cost option would not necessarily be available to those without such social
connections.198 Third, those with fewer economic resources may not be able to
enter the market to retain an attorney. Even if an attorney is available at an
affordable cost, it is likely that attorney quality varies with cost, meaning that the
attorneys available to lower-income people would be lower-quality and so more
likely to make mistakes.199 In other words, because formalistic probate
doctrines require specialized legal knowledge, it is those with fewer resources—
legal knowledge, networks that involve an attorney, or economic resources to
hire an attorney—who will bear the brunt of these doctrines.200

196. See Nancy Ehrenreich, Subordination and Symbiosis: Mechanisms of Mutual Support
Between Subordinating Systems, 71 UMKC L. REV. 251, 280 (2002) (noting the ways in
which “systems of subordination” reinforce each other).
197. See Alyssa A. DiRusso, Testacy and Intestacy: The Dynamics of Wills and Demographic
Status, 23 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 36, 48–51 (2009) (noting that those with lower levels of
education and income suffer higher rates of intestacy). This group could be further
subdivided along other demographic characteristics, such as race, age, and sex. See id. at
42–45, 51–52. One could also argue that individuals experiencing disadvantage due to
their sexual orientation also experienced systematic disadvantage, as same-sex
relationships were not intelligible to the law until recently. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.
Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (legalizing same-sex marriage).
198. See Rachel F. Moran, Whatever Happened to Racism?, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 899, 905 (2005)
(noting how social networks can perpetuate racial inequality if they remain relatively
homogeneous).
199. See sources cited supra note 83.
200. See George C. Harris & Derek F. Foran, The Ethics of Middle-Class Access to Legal Services
and What We Can Learn From the Medical Profession’s Shift to a Corporate Paradigm, 70
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The principles of desert and priority will not necessarily highlight the
same types of inequalities as worthy of critique, nor will they encompass
the same individuals who suffer donative errors. For example, one might be a
wealthy individual who attempts to engage in will execution but fails to do so
correctly, even though she had the resources to hire a high-priced attorney.
The donative error that this individual experiences will be pernicious from a
desert perspective, but not necessarily from a priority perspective.
Alternatively, one might not have had the resources to hire such an attorney or
the legal knowledge to execute a will on one’s own, but never even bothered to
try to execute a will. In this case, a desert-based analysis would not see the
donative error generated as particularly problematic, but a prioritarian analysis
would still find harmful the fact that the burden of donative error falls on
someone who is less fortunate.
The most sympathetic cases—and thus the ones that most strongly
demand legal reform—are those in which both the principles of priority and
desert apply. These cases involve individuals who may not have had the social
or economic resources to hire a competent attorney or draft a valid will on their
own, but who regardless made a good faith effort to do so. Those reforms that
address the circumstances of these individuals will receive the strongest support
from the distributive analysis presented here. At the same time, certain
doctrinal reforms might have spillover effects that will help individuals with a
mixed status like those described above. The final section explores the options
for legal reform.
B.

Legal Reform

One could attack the unjustified inequalities in the probate system at
many levels, and this Subpart addresses the levers that are available to do so
within legal doctrine. One could of course dream bigger and instead tackle the
broad economic and social inequalities that drive the inequalities in inheritance
law.201 This addresses the root problem head on, rather than using the legal
system to try to remedy the pernicious side effects of societal inequality after the

FORDHAM L. REV. 775, 775 (2001) (“Recent empirical surveys by bar associations tend to
confirm that middle-class Americans often lack access to affordable legal services. These
studies suggest that, more often than not, ‘ordinary’ people with a need for legal services go
without.”).
201. See Paul Gowder, Equal Law in an Unequal World, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1021, 1066–67 (2014)
(arguing that the rule of law may require some redress of economic inequalities if there is
an economic prerequisite to the application of the law itself).
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fact.202 It also clarifies and simplifies the application of the distributive justice
rationale to the probate system; if unjustified social and economic inequalities
were eliminated, then the remaining donative errors would more likely derive
from an individual’s lack of motivation to engage in estate planning or an
individual’s conscious choice to allocate resources towards other activities that
are deemed more important.
The main drawback to the broader approach is that eliminating social and
economic inequality is not an easily realizable goal. At the very least, it is not
one that is easily realizable in the short term.203 Thus, if this were the singular
strategy for addressing the inequalities in the inheritance system, many
individuals would not see their donative intent realized in the interim before
full societal equality was achieved.204 This is not to say that we should abandon
legal or political reform efforts to address more systemic forms of social and
economic inequality. To the contrary, to the extent that this Article draws
attention to another negative effect of socioeconomic inequality—namely the
effect on the distribution of donative errors—it adds to the lengthy list of
reasons to address broad societal inequality.
While such broader reform efforts are laudable, this Article focuses on
reforms of the probate system. These reforms are all geared towards reducing
the unequal distribution of undeserved donative errors that fall on those who
are less well-off in the donor population. The reforms overlap with but do not
mirror those that have been advocated by other scholars, who have typically
focused on efficiency-based concerns of reducing the overall number of
donative errors. A positive feature of this distributive analysis is that it does not
necessarily conflict with a focus on efficiency.205 In other words, one need not
sacrifice an overall reduction in donative errors to achieve a more egalitarian

202. See Matthew Dimick, Should the Law Do Anything About Economic Inequality?, 26
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 2–3 (2016) (noting that the law and economics scholarship
generally believes that the legal system should not generally be used for distributive goals).
203. See David B. Grusky & Alair MacLean, The Social Fallout of a High-Inequality Regime, 663
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 33, 39–46 (2016) (discussing the modernization and
marketization explanations for economic inequality); Thomas W. Mitchell, Growing
Inequality and Racial Economic Gaps, 56 HOW. L.J. 849, 868–74 (2013) (discussing the
reasons why there has not been a substantial social movement for economic equality).
204. That being said, there is at least one prominent example of this strategy’s succeeding, and
rapidly: same-sex marriage. The movement for marriage equality succeeded faster than
many had thought possible and before states recognized nonmarital same-sex partners in
intestacy codes. See Stacey L. Sobel, Culture Shifting at Warp Speed: How the Law, Public
Engagement, and Will & Grace Led to Social Change for LGBT People, 89 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
143, 144 (2015) (noting that the marriage equality movement has advanced at “legal warp
speed”).
205. See supra text accompanying notes 112–113.
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distribution of those errors. This is because the primary subpopulation
afflicted by donative errors is likely those who are less well-off in the donor
population, or those who lack access to legal knowledge or socioeconomic
resources to retain an attorney. Therefore, helping to satisfy the donative intent
of this population through modifications of the probate system serves to reduce
both the number of donative errors and any inequalities in the distribution of
errors.
The following subsections describe some illustrative examples of the
types of legal reforms that receive the support of the distributive analysis
presented in this Article. The first subsection deals with simplifying will
execution to ensure that individuals regardless of all wealth can express their
donative intents. The second subsection discusses the work of probate courts
in sorting through imperfectly drafted or executed wills.
1.

Simplifying Will Execution

The estate planning process is complicated, and the formalistic legal
doctrines that govern the willmaking process do not help the average
person to express donative intent.206 Disparate access to the legal
knowledge needed to execute a will interacts with these doctrines to create
inequalities in the distribution of donative errors.207 Because increasing the
legal knowledge of the general population is likely to fail,208 an alternative would
be to adjust the law to meet the knowledge level of the general population,
provided it still accomplishes the goals of the probate system.
There are several ways to adjust the law accordingly. For example,
legislatures could reduce the level of formalities required to execute a will—
typically a writing, signature, and attestation by two witnesses—to bring it in
line with popular understandings of what the law is. One possibility would be
to increase the options for satisfying the attestation requirement, by continuing to
allow the traditional option of two witnesses but adding the alternative of
attestation by a lone notary.209 The advantage of this approach is that many

206. See supra Part I.B.
207. See supra Part I.B.
208. See Reid Kress Weisbord, The Advisory Function of Law, 90 TUL. L. REV. 129, 135 (2015)
(noting that the complexity and enormity of the legal and regulatory system prevents
individuals from fully grasping its content).
209. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502(a)(3) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (permitting attestation
“before a notary public or other individual authorized by law to take acknowledgments”).
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individuals think that getting a document notarized is what makes it “legal.”210
Unfortunately, the notarization approach to will execution has only been
implemented in two states.211 The tradition of conforming law to custom in
this way has a strong tradition in the law, though it has more often been applied
to contexts with sophisticated commercial entities.212 When it has salutary
effects for less sophisticated actors and does not harm the policy purposes
behind the formalities of will execution, adopting notarization is a reasonable
reform that will reduce inequalities in the distribution of donative errors.
A second general strategy in this vein—doubtless one that will be
unattractive to the estate planning bar—is to make it easier to execute a will
without an attorney.213 This could involve authorizing other classes of
professionals to help facilitate the creation of legal documents, as California has
done with Legal Document Assistants.214 Alternatively, it could be providing
ways for individuals to be self-reliant in their own legal planning. For example,
states could expand the permissibility of holographic wills, or wills that are
completely in the handwriting of the testator so that they do not need to be

210. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, The UPC Authorizes Notarized Wills, 34 ACTEC J. 83, 85
(2008) (“The public is accustomed to thinking that a document is made ‘legal’ by getting it
notarized. To some, this conception is mistakenly but understandably carried over to
executing a will.”) (footnotes omitted); see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 cmt. (UNIF.
LAW COMM’N 2010) (“In addition, lay people (and, sad to say, some lawyers) think that a
will is valid if notarized, which is not true under non-UPC law.”).
211. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-502 (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08-02 (2010).
212. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014) (“[The Uniform Commercial Code] must be
liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies, which are:
. . . (2) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage,
and agreement of the parties . . . .”); K. N. Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52
HARV. L. REV. 873, 903 (1939) (making “a plea for merchants’ law to be recognized, and to
be further made for merchants”).
213. See Richard V. Wellman, Arkansas and the Uniform Probate Code: Some Issues and
Answers, 2 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK. L.J. 1, 15 (1979) (“What lawyers usually fail to perceive,
possibly because of conflicting interests in the fees that come from assisting persons with
wills, is that the public plainly insists on being permitted to use a ‘do-it-yourself’ approach
to will making, as is permitted in virtually every other enterprise.”). The criticism that
having to obtain an attorney to engage in estate planning is not new. See Sir Edward
Sugden, Speech in the House of Commons (Dec. 4, 1837), in THE LAW OF WILLS BILL 16
(John Murray ed., 1838) (calling the need to consult an attorney a “clog upon the
transmission of property by Will”).
214. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6401.6 (West 2003) (authorizing the existence of legal
document assistants but requiring that they not engage in the practice of law); see also
Jennifer S. Bard & Larry Cunningham, Opinion, The Legal Profession Is Failing LowIncome and Middle-Class People. Let’s Fix That., WASH. POST (June 5, 2017),
http://wapo.st/2rt8MLZ?tid=ss_tw&utm_term=.c2dc7cfd2bed [https://perma.cc/43XLAPWF] (advocating for different tiers of legal professionals).
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attested by witnesses.215 Currently, only a slight majority of states permit this
type of final testament.216 This would target those who do not know of the
attestation requirement at all and try to execute wills themselves without
an attorney.217 A recent empirical study found that holographic wills were not
as prone to drafting errors, fraud, or forgery as one might initially assume.218
Further, the proliferation of wills forms on the Internet makes this an attractive
option, though it requires modifying applicable statutes to allow that some of
the holographic will not be in the testator’s handwriting.219
A final reform of this type is Professor Reid Kress Weisbord’s innovative
proposal for a “testamentary schedule,” an optional form attached to state
income tax returns that could express donative intent and be updated
electronically as needed. This proposal would both simplify the estate planning
process and connect it to the task of paying taxes, which many in the donor
population engage with anyway.220 This type of “one-stop shopping” is
considered a valuable way of delivering legal and other professional services
simultaneously, and it may prove fruitful in allowing individuals to accomplish
multiple planning and administrative tasks at once as well.221
The primary advantage of these approaches is that they address the
incidents of social and economic inequalities, even if they do not eliminate the
inequalities themselves. However, these types of strategies have their limits as
well, as ease of will execution can be in tension with other goals of the estate

215. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (“(b) [Holographic Wills.]
A will that does not comply with subsection (a) is valid as a holographic will, whether or
not witnessed, if the signature and material portions of the document are in the testator’s
handwriting.”).
216. See SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 11, at 198 (indicating which states have permitted
holographic wills).
217. See Kevin R. Natale, A Survey, Analysis, and Evaluation of Holographic Will Statutes, 17
HOFSTRA L. REV. 159, 160 (1988) (“Legislatures authorize holographic wills as a means of
convenience to testators, enabling those who are either unable or unwilling to obtain legal
assistance to make a valid will in their own handwriting.” (citing In re Estate of Teubert,
298 S.E.2d 456, 460 (W. Va. 1982))).
218. See Stephen Clowney, In Their Own Hand: An Analysis of Holographic Wills and
Homemade Willmaking, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 27, 52–53 (2008) (noting that while
not error-free, holographic wills provide an affordable way to engage in estate planning
that does not raise the specter of litigation).
219. See In re Estate of Muder, 765 P.2d 997, 1000 (Ariz. 1988) (holding that filling out the
material portions of a preprinted form in one’s own handwriting was sufficient to qualify
as a holographic will).
220. See Weisbord, supra note 74, at 924–35.
221. See Spencer Rand, Hearing Stories Already Told: Successfully Incorporating Third Party
Professionals Into the Attorney-Client Relationship, 80 TENN. L. REV. 1, 12 (2012)
(highlighting the benefits of such a model).
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planning process.222 For example, formalities in the will execution process
serve various functions,223 and there is some debate about whether the lack of
witnesses for holographic wills serves to protect the testator from being unduly
influenced or coerced.224 In addition, the estate planning bar still provides
useful guidance in understanding what types of property interests an individual
might hold, the interrelationship between probate and nonprobate assets, and
contingency planning for events that the lay person may not contemplate or
understand on her own.225 These concerns should be weighed against the
benefits of reducing inequality in the distribution of donative errors.
2.

Enabling Judicial Discretion

While the previous set of reforms addressed the will execution process,
this group of reforms focuses on what probate courts may do with the fruits of
those often imperfect will execution attempts. There have been many reforms
suggested of the formalistic doctrines in the probate system, ranging from
proposed modification of the intestacy regime to a re-imagination of will
execution and construction.226 These reforms share an emphasis on more
contextual approaches, which have three distinct features. First, they permit
judges to examine a wider range of evidence, not just the text of a relevant
document or the legal relationship between the decedent and an heir.227

222. Kent D. Schenkel, Testamentary Fragmentation and the Diminishing Role of the Will: An
Argument for Revival, 41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 155, 162 (2008) (describing how an estate
planning attorney can continue to be useful, especially in the context of proliferating
nonprobate forms of transfer).
223. See sources cited supra note 58.
224. See Richard Lewis Brown, The Holograph Problem—The Case Against Holographic Wills,
74 TENN. L. REV. 93, 96–100 (2006) (describing the policies behind will formalities and how
holographs are problematic with respect to them). But see Lindgren, supra note 58, at 572–
73 (advocating the abolition of the attestation requirement altogether).
225. See John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission,
86 pMICH. L. REV. 722, 750 (1988) (“Increasingly, estate planning services for the middle
and upper-middle classes have the quality of contingency planning.”). This points to a
more general tension in how the law serves the population. See Jane E. Larson, Informality,
Illegality, and Inequality, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 137, 165–66 (2002) (discussing the
tradeoffs between providing high-quality services and equal access to services).
226. See T.P. Gallanis, Inheritance Rights for Domestic Partners, 79 TUL. L. REV. 55, 82–90 (2004)
(proposing the inclusion of domestic partners in intestacy law); E. Gary Spitko, The
Expressive Function of Succession Law and the Merits of Non-Marital Inclusion, 41 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1063, 1089–90 (1999) (discussing a proposal by Professor Waggoner in the same
vein); supra text accompanying notes 103–107 (discussing reform proposals of wills
doctrines).
227. See, e.g., Concerned Residents of Santa Fe N., Inc. v. Santa Fe Estates, Inc., 182 P.3d 794,
807 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008) (“[A] court may go beyond the four corners and consider
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Second, they give judges discretion to apply background policies directly rather
than mandating following rule-like directives to the letter.228 Third, these more
fact-intensive inquiries raise the specter that more judicial resources will be
consumed in carrying them out.229 It is this third feature that may make
legislatures unwilling to adopt such reforms, despite the argument that doing so
would be more efficient by reducing the overall number of donative errors.230
The distributive argument presented here may help justify expending resources
on some of these reforms, as it reveals that the resources would go toward
remedying inequalities that affect many middle-class citizens, including many
legislators’ own constituents.
However, one significant set of reforms—those of the intestacy system—
do not receive the unqualified support of the distributive analysis presented
here. Several scholars have suggested reforming those statutes so that the court
may inquire into caregiving or functional family relationships to decide how to
distribute property more in line with donative intent.231 This would require an
analysis by the court of information beyond just the legal relationship of blood,
adoption, or marriage between the decedent and another person. Decedents
who experience intestacy tend to have lower levels of education and income,
and they may represent worse-off elements of the donor population.232 Thus,
from a prioritarian perspective, the donative errors experienced by this group
are particularly pernicious. These individuals who did not attempt to execute a
will can also be said to have assumed the risk that intestacy codes would not
match their donative preferences, leading to donative error. In other words,

228.

229.
230.
231.

232.

evidence outside the contract itself to explain the purposes or context of the contract. This
is called ‘the contextual approach to contract interpretation . . . .’” (quoting Mark V, Inc. v.
Mellekas, 845 P.2d 1232, 1235 (N.M. 1993)).
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-33.1 (West 2016) (requiring that the normal rules of
construction “shall apply unless the probable intention of the testator, as indicated by the
will and relevant circumstances, is contrary”); see also Mark Glover, A Taxonomy of
Testamentary Intent, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 569, 603 (2016) (“[T]he harmless error rule
and the reformation doctrine give courts significantly more discretion in deciding issues of
testamentary intent than under traditional law.”).
See Catharine Wells, Situated Decisionmaking, 63 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1727, 1740 (1990)
(noting that contextual approaches can be time-consuming).
See supra text accompanying notes 103–107.
See, e.g., Gary, supra note 53, at 71–73 (arguing for court discretion to find a functional
parent-child relationship for intestacy purposes); E. Gary Spitko, An Accrual/Multi-Factor
Approach to Intestate Inheritance Rights for Unmarried Committed Partners, 81 OR. L. REV.
255, 258 (2002) (advocating inclusion of committed unmarried partners in intestacy
codes); see also Foster, supra note 55, at 257–68 (critiquing intestacy laws for their rigidity
in not recognizing caregiving relationships that may not be captured by blood, adoption,
or marriage).
See DiRusso, supra note 197, at 48–51.
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these donative errors are traceable to the decedent’s failure to act, a behavior
not worthy of praise. So from a desert perspective, the donative errors that
befall this group may be in fact justified. Because the principles of priority and
desert point in different directions here, such reforms would be a lower
priority. However, these reforms might still be worth pursuing, as many might
be convinced by the prioritarian analysis coupled with the standard
efficiency arguments. These prioritarian and efficiency arguments, however,
would have to be weighed against the likely increase in decision costs that such
reforms would entail.
In contrast to intestacy, both the principles of desert and priority favor
reforms in the areas of will execution and construction. In this context,
individuals have actually tried to produce something that purports to be a will,
unlike the nonplanners above. As noted in Subpart I.B, the strict compliance
and plain meaning rules that currently govern will execution and construction
are harsh on any mistakes made by these planners.233 These mistakes are more
likely when an individual lacks specialized legal knowledge or the economic
resources to hire a skilled attorney. This, in turn, creates inequalities in the
distribution of donative errors when courts adhere to them, all despite a
planner’s best efforts. Therefore, reforming these doctrines should be a priority.
The harmless error and reformation rules are positive steps in that direction.
Harmless error doctrine excuses a noncompliant will if there is clear and
convincing evidence that the testator intended the document in question to be
her will.234 Likewise, the reformation rule allows courts to reform mistakes if
there is clear and convincing evidence of what the decedent’s drafting intention
was and if the terms of the document were the product of a mistake.235 These
doctrines have similar structures, as they use contextual inquiries coupled with
heightened evidentiary burdens rather than bright-line rules to police the
admission and construction of wills by probate courts.236 While some have

233. See supra Part I.B.
234. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-523 (West 2015).
235. Erickson v. Erickson, 716 A.2d 92, 98 (Conn. 1998) (ruling that if a scrivener’s error and
the testator’s intent can be established by clear and convincing evidence, errors may be
corrected).
236. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt. e (AM.
LAW INST. 2003) (“Tilting the risk of an erroneous factual determination in this fashion is
appropriate because the party seeking reformation is seeking to establish that a donative
document does not reflect the donor’s intention. This tilt also deters a potential plaintiff
from bringing a reformation suit on the basis of insubstantial evidence.”).
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criticized these as increasing judicial decision costs, evidence from other
countries indicates that they do not necessarily do so.237
This Part has applied the distributive analytical framework to the probate
system and the individuals who pass through it. The focus is on those
individuals who performed the relevant desert basis—a good faith attempt at
will execution—and are more likely to be at the lower end of the socioeconomic
spectrum in the donor population, even if they might not be in the lower
socioeconomic strata of the overall population. Reforms addressed to this
group fall into two categories. First, the legal system might simplify the will
execution process, either by reducing the formalities for will execution or by
creating time-saving ways to engage in estate planning. Second, the legal
system might enable probate judges to admit imperfect wills and fix obvious
drafting mistakes in wills that are admitted. These broad strategies, however,
are not exhaustive; other types of reforms, such as those of the intestacy regime,
might receive some support from the distributive analysis presented here as
well.
CONCLUSION
Inheritance law scholarship and practice have long focused on those with
the most property in the donor population, and discussion of reform has
traditionally focused on reducing the overall level of donative errors. This
Article highlights the needs of the middle class and emphasizes significant
distributive concerns. The hope is that this will provide reformers with further
arguments for changes in law and practice, urge scholars to think about and
openly discuss the distributive effects of their proposals, and prompt
practitioners to imagine ways to help those individuals who might have only
modest property to transfer at death.

237. See Langbein, supra note 88, at 45–52 (examining the implementation of harmless error in
Australia, Canada, and Israel, and finding that neither litigation nor drafting errors increased as
a result of the new doctrine); see also Stephanie Lester, Comment, Admitting Defective
Wills to Probate, Twenty Years Later: New Evidence for the Adoption of the Harmless Error
Rule, 42 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 577, 603–06 (2007) (conducting a follow-up study and
finding that harmless error continues to be successful).
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